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Abstract
We present a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) frame-
work to correlate, attribute and predict attacks against an ICT system.
The output of the assessment of ICT risk, that exploits multiple simula-
tions of attacks against the system, drives the building of a SIEM database.
This database enables the SIEM to correlate sequences of detected attacks,
to probabilistically attribute and predict attacks, and to discover 0-day vul-
nerability.
After describing the framework and its prototype implementation, we
discuss the experimental results on the main SIEM capabilities.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Intrusion Prevention and Detection
Modern ICT systems rely on a complex infrastructure that strongly increases
the complexity of the security monitoring.
While current Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems consider the
attacks in isolation, the attack scenarios they have to face are rather complex.
As an example, several tools that are freely available can be used to develop
malware to automatically attack system nodes from another node they have
already attacked. These tools can produce code that can result in very large
impact in a short time.
One of the most complex case intrusion prevention and detection system
have to face is the one of intelligent threat agents. These agents attack an ICT
system to achieve a predeﬁned goal. As an example, to steal some information
stored in a given node of the infrastructure. To reach any of its goals, the
agent has to acquire a set of access rights on the system components. When
achieving a goal, the agent may violate any of three main security properties:
integrity, conﬁdentiality and availability. The ﬁrst and the second one refer
to, respectively, the unauthorized updates and access to information, while
the third to a denial of service. The main problem an agent has to solve to
achieve a goal is that a single attack may not grant all the rights in a goal.
As a consequence, the agent has to implement a sequence of attacks.
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In the described scenario, current Intrusion Detection and Prevention
Systems may fail to protect the target system because they do not return
information to correlate attacks and discover those that belong to the same
sequence.
This justiﬁes the actual trend in implementing Security Information and
Event Management (SIEM) tools. This new security tool should rebuild a
complete and reliable security status of the system by collecting and correlat-
ing the output of a large network of sensors, where each sensor detects single
attacks against system components. A SIEM system should not only enable
a security administrator to discover and react to attacks in real-time but also
to discover network misconﬁguration, weaknesses, and system updates.
Despite the large number of available tools and their capabilities, the
automation of the integration and of the correlation of data from a sensor
network is still an open problem.
These challenges and their impact on security are the main motivations
of this thesis that deﬁnes and evaluates a new SIEM framework to correlate,
attribute and predict attacks against an ICT system.
1.2 Thesis goals
This thesis evaluates an overall framework to solve the problems previously
outlined. These problems are the correlation, attribution and prediction of
attacks against the target system.
The correlation is the problem of how to interpret a set of alerts to pair
it with a proper meaning. An alert is the alarm raised by a sensor when it
detects an attack. A proper meaning is the discovery of the attack sequence
that an agent implements to escalate its privileges.
The SIEM needs a proper knowledge base to correctly correlate alerts.
This knowledge can be acquired from several sources. One of them is the
output of a tool to automatically assess the risk of an ICT system. This tool
returns, among others, a database with the attack sequences each intelligent
agent implements against the target system to reach its goal.
By exploiting the risk and vulnerability assessment to drive the building
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 3
of the SIEM database, we can increase the correlation capability of the SIEM,
because it is aware of the attacks the agents may implement. Furthermore,
a mismatch in the correlation may signal a possible 0-day vulnerability, i.e.
a vulnerability that is not public yet, or an unknown update to the target
system.
The correlation of alerts supports the attribution and prediction. The
former consists in the identiﬁcation of the agent that is currently implement-
ing a detected sequence, while the latter consists in the forecast of the next
attacks. The solutions to these problems simplify the discovery of the goal
the agent aims to achieve and of its next attacks. The attribution of a se-
quence of attacks and the prediction of the next one constitute an important
mechanisms to minimize or completely avoid the impact of attacks.
Another approach we evaluate to identify attacking agents relies on the
generation of unique attack combinations, the patterns. Patterns are gener-
ated by analyzing the attack sequences each agent implements. The set of
patterns is then matched against the alert stream to identify the correspond-
ing agent.
After implementing a SIEM framework with these features, we evaluate its
main capabilities. In particular, we focus on the evaluation of the reliability
and accuracy of the pattern matching, attribution and prediction.
1.3 Thesis structure
In addition to this chapter, the thesis is structured as follows.
Chapter 2 This chapter presents a survey of the current state-of-the-art
on Intrusion Detection System and Security Information and Event
Management. It also introduces the Haruspex suite that supports the
automated assessment of ICT system.
Chapter 3 This chapter outlines the proposed framework and the main
problems to correlate, predict and attribute attacks. It also discusses
the solutions we propose to these problems. This section also introduces
the deﬁnitions to formalize the framework.
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Chapter 4 This chapter discusses the prototype implementation of the frame-
work. We detail the main algorithms we have developed and the data
structures they exploit.
Chapters 5 and 6 These chapters report the experimental results to eval-
uate the main SIEM capabilities. In particular, we evaluate the agent
identiﬁcation and the prediction capabilities.
Chapter 7 This last chapter resumes the main results of the thesis and
outlines future works.
Chapter 2
Related works
This chapter reviews some concepts and works related to intrusion detection,
security information, event management, and risk assessment.
2.1 Intrusion Detection Systems
An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a device or software module that
monitors a system to detect attacks or policy violations. The monitoring
phase is implemented by means of sensors, entities that check events to
discover violations according to the approaches described in the following.
When these sensors detect a violation, they raise an alert with information
relative to the event. These concepts were ﬁrstly introduced in [5] and then
again formalized in [18]. A working group created by DARPA in 1998 deﬁned
a common framework for the IDS ﬁeld [41] and a common intrusion speciﬁ-
cation language about attacks and events to enable cooperation among the
components of an intrusion detection and response (ID&R) system.
A very simple IDS architecture is discussed in [17], depicting it as Figure
2.1. Basically, an IDS is a detector that processes information coming from
the system to be protected. Three kinds of information are used. The ﬁrst
one is long-term information related to the technique to detect intrusions (a
knowledge base of attacks, for example). The second kind of information is
conﬁguration information about the current state of the system. The third
5
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Figure 2.1: A simple IDS architecture
and last kind of information is audit information that describes the events
that may occur in the system. The role of the IDS is to eliminate useless in-
formation from the audit trail and present a synthetic view of security-related
actions by the users. A decision is then made to evaluate the probability that
these actions can be considered symptoms of an intrusion.
According to [6], several reasons support the adoption of an IDS such as
preventing attacks, increasing the perceived risk of discovery and punishment
of attackers, documenting the existing threat, and detecting the preambles
to attacks.
The IDS has to perform its task in real-time to be beneﬁcial from a secu-
rity perspective. In principle, an IDS has to deal with any kind of intrusion,
like network attacks against vulnerable services, data driven attacks on appli-
cations, host based attacks such as privilege escalation, unauthorized logins
and access to sensitive ﬁles, and malware (denial of service attack, viruses,
trojan horses, and worms). Alternative kinds of sensors analyze diﬀerent
data and apply distinct detection methods to deal with the distinct features
of an intrusion [27, 37, 46].
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2.1.1 Types of Intrusion Detection Systems
We can distinguish between network IDS (NIDS) and host IDS (HIDS).
NIDS can be further partitioned into two subtypes, the wireless IDS, fo-
cusing on wireless network, and the network behavior analysis (NBA) IDS,
examining traﬃc ﬂow on a network in an attempt to recognize abnormal
patterns like Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), malware, and policy vi-
olations.
Another kind of IDS of interest is a distributed IDS (DIDS) that combines
HIDS and NIDS to build an eﬃcient and cooperative security environment
to acquire a broader view of the whole security status of the system. One of
the ﬁrst examples is [40].
Network IDS
Since a NIDS monitors the network traﬃc, it is important that it can inspect
most of inbound and outbound network traﬃc. Ideally, all the traﬃc should
be analyzed, but this could impair the overall network performance. Each
packet is captured by a sniﬀer (both hardware and software solutions are
available) and then it is analyzed to detect possible attacks. This exploits
a special implementation of the TCP/IP stack that reassembles the packets
and applies protocol stack veriﬁcation, application protocol veriﬁcation, or
other veriﬁcation techniques.
In the protocol stack veriﬁcation, the NIDS looks for malformed data
packets that violate the TCP/IP protocol. This process is useful mainly to
detect DoS or DDoS attacks, because they rely on the creation of improperly
formed packets to exploit any weaknesses in the protocol stack.
The application stack veriﬁcation considers rules of higher-order proto-
cols, like HTTP, to discover unexpected packet behavior or improper use.
One example of this kind of attack it can discover is DNS cache poisoning.
This veriﬁcation process requires more computation time than the previous
one, so it could aﬀect the NIDS performance.
The main advantages of NIDS include:
• if the network is well designed, few NIDSs can monitor a very large
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network,
• NIDS, as passive devices, can be deployed with little or no disruption
to normal network operations,
• again as passive devices, they are usually not susceptible to direct at-
tacks and not detectable by attackers.
The disadvantages are:
• because of increasing network bandwidth, a NIDS can be overwhelmed
by network traﬃc, compromising also its detection capabilities,
• the NIDS eﬀectiveness is limited by encrypted communications and
fragmented packets,
• NIDS cannot reliably discovery whether an attack was successful.
One of the most adopted NIDS tool is Snort [31], a free and open source
network intrusion detection (and prevention) system, running on most mod-
ern operating systems. Furthermore, it is supported by a large community.
Snort performs real-time traﬃc analysis and packet logging on Internet Pro-
tocol (IP) networks, doing protocol analysis, content searching, and content
matching. Snort integrates distinct components. These components cooper-
ate to detect particular attacks and to generate output in a required format.
There are ﬁve main components. The Packet Decoder receives packet from
diﬀerent types of network interfaces. Diﬀerent Preprocessors are used to
normalize protocol headers, detect anomalies, packet reassembly and TCP
stream reassembly for the next detection phase. The Detection Engine de-
tects intrusion activity in packets. The Logging and Alerting System gener-
ates alerts and logs. Finally, the Output Modules generate the ﬁnal output
from the previous results.
Host IDS
The HIDS monitors a speciﬁc host or device on the network. Usually, in
the monitored host, the HIDS is installed as a dedicated software or hard-
ware that analyzes local events. The HIDS is also known as system integrity
CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORKS 9
veriﬁer because it monitors the status of key system ﬁles and detects when
an intruder creates, modiﬁes, or deletes a monitored ﬁle. The HIDS exam-
ines these ﬁles and system logs to determine if an attack is underway or has
occurred and if the attack was failed or successful. Since distinct priority
levels are associated with distinct resources, the most common method to
categorize folders and ﬁles is by color coding. Red coded resources, like OS
kernel, are the most critical one. The yellow coded, like device driver, are
less critical, while the green coded resources, like user data, are less urgent,
because they are frequently modiﬁed.
The advantages of HIDS include:
• it can detect local events on host systems and attacks that may elude
a NIDS,
• it can process encrypted traﬃc, because it is decrypted by the host,
• it can detect inconsistencies in the use of applications and of system
programs. This enables the detection of Trojan horse,
• it can detect success or failure of attacks with respect to NIDS.
As a counterpart, the main disadvantages are:
• more management is needed, because HIDS are conﬁgured and man-
aged on each monitored host,
• it is vulnerable both to direct attacks and to those against the host
operating system,
• it needs large amounts of disk space to store the host OS audit logs,
• it can noticeably aﬀect the performance of its host systems.
A widely used HIDS is OSSEC [12]. It is free and open source, and
provides intrusion detection for most operating systems. It performs log
analysis, integrity checking, Windows registry monitoring, rootkit detection,
time-based alerting, and active response. OSSEC has a centralized, cross-
platform architecture allowing multiple systems to be easily monitored and
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managed, such as databases (like MySQL), web servers (like Apache HTTP
Server), ﬁrewall (like Iptables), NIDS (also Snort), and many others. It is
composed by three components. The Main Application is required for dis-
tributed network or stand-alone installations. The Windows Agent monitors
Windows environments. The Web Interface provides a graphical user inter-
face.
2.1.2 Detection methods
When an IDS analyzes network traﬃc or local events to detect malicious
activities, it can apply three main strategies: signature based, anomaly based
and stateful packet inspection detection.
Signature based detection
Signature based approaches detect attacks by matching their input against
a database of signatures of known intrusions. As a consequence, the attacks
are signaled in a fairly accurate way.
The signature based detection method is widely used because many at-
tacks have unambiguous and distinct signatures. Consider, for example, ﬁn-
gerprinting activities and worms. They implement one of a small set of attack
sequences designed to exploit some vulnerabilities and control a system.
The advantages of this approach are the ease of writing a new signa-
ture and of understanding signature others have developed. Obviously, this
assumes that enough information on possible attacks is available. Further
advantages include a very precise notiﬁcation of the events that caused the
alerts and the ability of simplifying the signature database by disabling rules
not needed. As an example, rules for SMTP traﬃc are not enabled if an
administrator knows that this traﬃc is not utilized.
Drawbacks include the need to gather the most comprehensive set of
information on an attack to extract a accurate signature and the frequency
of updates to the rule database. This method cannot detect a completely
new vulnerability and so its exploit, a so called 0-day attack.
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Anomaly based detection
Anomaly based detection is an approach based upon statistics that assume
that we know the normal behavior for a node or network. Under this as-
sumption, detection is implemented by comparing statistical indicators, like
the volume of network traﬃc or CPU usage, against the normal behavior.
The main advantage is the detection of 0-day attack if they result in a
behavior that fall out of the interval of normal statistics. Another advantage
is the ease of adaption that only requires the update of the thresholds rather
than the deﬁnition of new signatures.
The drawbacks are the high number of false positives, events signaled as
malicious while they are not, and the complexity to collect data to statisti-
cally deﬁne the normal behavior.
Stateful packet inspection approach
Assuming that the IDS knows how a protocol, such as FTP, is supposed to
work, it can detect anomalous behavior.
Relevant data per session are stored and then used to identify intrusions
that involve multiple requests and responses. This approach can also detect
multisession attacks. The Stateful Protocol Analysis (SPA) examines packets
at the application layer for information extracting. This is also referred as
deep packet inspection.
The main drawback is the complexity of session based detection, as it
introduces both heavy processing and memory overhead to track multiple
simultaneous connections.
2.2 Security Information and Event Manage-
ment
A Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) is a component that
implements real-time analysis of the alerts generated by sensors. In some
sense, it is the evolution of an IDS.
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Figure 2.2: The general SIEM architecture
As the name suggests, a SIEM combines the aspects of Security Event
Management (SEM) and the Security Information Management (SIM). The
former deals with real-time monitoring, correlation of events, notiﬁcations
and console views. Instead, the latter provides long-term storage, analysis
and reporting of log data.
The general architecture of a SIEM is discussed in [28] in terms of the
Figure 2.2. The ﬁrst part of a SIEM is the source device that feeds informa-
tion into the SIEM. A source device is the device, or the application, that
supplies logs to store and process in the SIEM. A modern SIEM can coop-
erate with diﬀerent source devices, even from diﬀerent vendors. Actually, a
log collection process retrieves diﬀerent logs in two ways. Either the source
device sends its logs to the SIEM (push method), or the SIEM reaches out
and retrieves the logs from the source device (pull method). Because logs are
still in their native format, they have to be parsed and normalized in a single
format. Now the rule engine analyzes the normalized logs events to trigger
alerts due to speciﬁc conditions. The correlation engine is a subset of the
rule engine that matches multiple standard events from diﬀerent sources to
produce a single correlated event. To take into account the volume of logs
that the SIEM receives, usually the logs are stored in a database, a ﬂat text
ﬁle or a binary ﬁle. Finally, the SIEM implements a method, web-based or
application-based, to enable the user to interact with the logs.
[25] describes a framework for attack modeling and security evaluation in
SIEM systems. This framework includes several steps:
1. the modeling of malicious behavior,
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2. the generation an attack graph,
3. the evaluation of distinct security metrics,
4. the deﬁnition of risk analysis procedures.
The key elements are the use of a comprehensive security repository, and
of an eﬀective attack graph (tree) generation techniques (also in near-real
time). Furthermore, it takes into account known and new attacks based
on 0-day vulnerabilities, and it supports stochastic analytical modeling, and
interactive decision support to select the most eﬀective security solutions.
The deﬁned Attack Modeling and Security Evaluation Component (AMSEC)
can behave in two modes. In non real-time mode, AMSEC produces the list
of weak network places, possible 0-day vulnerabilities, and the set of attack
trees. This output is computed through the model of the computer network.
In turn, this model is deﬁned according to the design speciﬁcations as well
as to the network conﬁguration and security policy. In the real-time or near
real-time one, the AMSEC adjusts existing attack trees and malefactor model
to predicts actions of an attacker and generate countermeasures.
One of the most popular SIEM tool is OSSIM [23]. It is an open source
SIEM, that integrates a selection of tools that support network administra-
tors in computer security, intrusion detection and prevention. OSSIM pro-
vides integration, management, and visualization through a browser-based
user interface of events of open source security tools, like Snort and OSSEC.
More important, OSSIM simpliﬁes the integration of new security devices
and applications. After the normalization of the collected alerts, OSSIM ap-
plies event ﬁltering and prioritization through conﬁgurable policies. OSSIM
applies three types of correlations. Inventory Correlation ﬁlters attacks to
speciﬁc kind of asset, e.g. Windows threat to Linux box. Cross Correla-
tion compares event and vulnerability analysis results. Logical Correlation
correlates using user deﬁned condition trees.
A core task of a SIEM is the correlation among alerts to understand
what is happening in the system to inform a security expert, deploy some
countermeasures, and so on. A general characterization of the correlation
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process is explained in [43], and reﬁned in [36]. We can distinguish four
phases. At ﬁrst, the alert enters the preprocessing phase for the normalization
and enrichment with other useful information for the next phases. Then,
the reduction phase ﬁlters and validates the alert. The third step is the
correlation phase that tries to ﬁnd out how an actual alert is related to the
previous ones. The fourth step, the prioritization phase, ranks the previous
results according to their severity.
During the correlation phase, the SIEM tries to discover the meaning of
the alerts stream received so far. A possible way to explain alerts correlation,
as in [30], is the generation of hyperalerts. These abstractions are basically
concrete attacks to the system and compose a correlation graph, representing
the diﬀerent attack scenarios. Diﬀerent techniques can be used to ﬁnd a
causal relation between hyperalerts, such as temporal constraints, but more
important, the cause-eﬀect one, expressed as prerequisites and consequences
of each hyperalert.
In the following we describe diﬀerent approaches for alerts correlation,
because it is the kernel of the intelligence of every SIEM tool.
2.2.1 Alerts correlation
In last years, a large amount of research eﬀorts focused on alerts correlation
techniques and their taxonomy [11, 35, 36, 49, 51].
Several deﬁnitions of alert correlation can be found in the literature [19,
21, 33], but all these deﬁnitions basically describe alert correlation as the
interpretation of multiple alarms to pair them with a proper meaning.
Alerts, also referred as alarms, are generally short textual messages in a
speciﬁc format deﬁned by vendors or by a standard, like the IDMEF [16].
They are generated on the basis of a matching between some predeﬁned
rules and network or host events. Typically, alerts contain general infor-
mation regarding the device issuing them, e.g. its IP, and the event itself,
e.g. the creation time, a description of the event, references to vulnerabilities
database, impact, and so on.
Several reasons favor the adoption of alert correlation. The most impor-
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tant one is the need of discovering the root causes of a problem. An example
of a root cause is an initiating cause of an attack chain [22].
Alert correlation techniques are used in three diﬀerent application do-
mains: network management, industrial process control (SCADA system)
and network and system security. Obviously, here we focus on this last do-
main.
In the ﬁeld of network and system security, alerts are generated by secu-
rity elements such as NIDS and HIDS. Since the sensitivity of the detection
process is highly variable, they could generate a huge amount of alarms,
where some of them only signal normal activity rather than attacks (false
positives). Alerts correlation simpliﬁes the evaluation of the validity of those
alerts, and, more important, the detection of complex and multistep attack
scenarios. Usually, this results in a comprehensive view on the security state
of a system.
Alert correlation can use several sources of information, besides the alerts
itself. For instance, we recall topology information [14] and vulnerabilities
databases [47].
Focusing on distinct strategies to correlate alerts, in the literature we
ﬁnd three main category, similarity-based, sequential-based and case-based
methods.
Similarity-based methods
Similarity-based methods try to cluster and aggregate alerts using their sim-
ilarities in attributes such as the IP addresses, port, protocol and timestamp
information. We can distinguish between attribute and temporal based cat-
egories, depending on how similarity is computed. Attribute based tech-
niques correlate alerts by computing predeﬁned metrics, such as Euclidean,
Mahalanobis, Minkowski, and/or Manhattan distance functions on some at-
tributes. The resulting scores are compared to a threshold to determine if
alerts have to be correlated. Instead, temporal based techniques rely on
timing constraints.
In [42] a probabilistic method is proposed. An appropriate similarity
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function is deﬁned for each attribute in a range from zero (mismatch) to
one (perfect match). The overall similarity is computed through an equation
that combines the results of the previous functions. For each new alert, the
similarity is computed for existing meta-alerts, and the newly created alert is
merged with the best matching meta-alert, as long as the similarity is larger
than a threshold value. Otherwise, a new meta-alert is created.
[15] uses a distinct approach, an expert system one, that deﬁnes the sim-
ilarity relationship in terms of requirements, each speciﬁed through expert
rules. These rules are domain speciﬁc and they are deﬁned through an anal-
ysis of the alerts generated by distinct IDSs. The rules are partitioned into
four categories based on alerts attributes. These are classiﬁcation, time,
source and target of the alert.
[1] uses several time windows, along with a trained classiﬁcation method,
to avoid comparing new alerts against the whole set of received alerts. Then,
alerts are correlated though a probability estimation function. Two alerts
are correlated if their temporal similarity is higher than a threshold.
The well-know concept of entropy is the basis of [20]. For each alert,
the partial entropy is calculated to ﬁnd the alert clusters with the same
information. Alert clusters are represented by hyper-alert. Finally a subset
of hyper-alerts is selected according to the entropy maximization.
The similarity-based method is the simplest one and it can be imple-
mented through simple and lightweight algorithms. However, the important
drawback is that it cannot detect root causes. The identiﬁcation of a root
cause is very useful, because it is an initiating cause of an attack chain.
Hence, we can prevent further occurrences of the attack chain by removing
its root cause [22].
Sequential-based methods
Sequential-based methods group alerts according to causality relationships,
represented as a logical formula using combinations of logical operators, on
pre-conditions and consequences of attacks.
A large number of solutions has been proposed, using several approaches
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to model a scenario. We can mention, as an example, pre/post conditions,
(attack) graphs and (Hidden) Markov models.
In the pre/post conditions category we recall MARS [3, 4]. Attack con-
sequences are modeled through vulnerability and extensional consequences.
The latter is an extended description of possible consequences in a form of
predicates with free variables of facts, such as IP addresses. At ﬁrst, raw
alerts are normalized and then aggregated. Instances of multi-stage attack
instances are generated by correlating aggregated alerts. The proposed ap-
proach is a variation of the requires/provides model and considers ﬁve factors
to determine the link between stages of attack sequences. These factors are
temporal (alert timestamps) and spatial (IP addresses and port) relation-
ships, pre and post conditions of attacks, vulnerability assessment of the
target system and its conﬁguration.
[44, 45] use an attack graph approach. The correlation is based on a
Queue Graph, which has the ability to hypothesize missing alerts and to
predict future alerts. It only keeps in memory the latest alert matching
for well-known exploits. The correlation between a new alert and the in-
memory ones is explicitly recorded, whereas the correlation with other alerts
is implicitly represented in terms of the temporal order between alerts. This
improves the overall eﬃciency as the correlation process does not need to
scan all the previously received alerts.
An interesting hybrid model is proposed in [2]. It consists of two parts.
The main one applies an attack graph-based method, extending [45], to corre-
late alerts raised for known attacks and hypothesize missed alerts. Instead,
the second one uses a similarity-based method, based on [1], to correlate
alerts raised for unknown attacks which cannot be correlated by the ﬁrst
part. The novelty of the approach is the capability of hypothesizing missed
exploits and of discovering defects in pre and post conditions of known ex-
ploits in attack graphs. It can also update the attack graph by applying the
similarity-based method in the second part of the model.
An interesting combination of attack graph and Hidden Markov Model
(HMM) is used in [34], that presents a formal model of the correlation al-
gorithm. The algorithm can be parameterized to tune its robustness and
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accuracy. Two approaches improve the speed and quality of the algorithm.
Firstly, a parallel multi-core version, using both CPUs and GPUs, is pro-
posed. Then, on a HMM-supported version, the Viterbi Path algorithm is
computed to identify the most probable path in the corresponding attack
graph. The correlation platform can work in real-time.
[48] uses the Hidden Markov Models to represent typical attack scenarios.
It includes an online tracking and prediction module and an oine model-
training module. The former searches the best attack scenario to describe
the alert sequence and ﬁnds the most likelihood state transition (attack in-
tention), while the latter uses the historical alert data to build the Hidden
Markov Models for the typical attack scenario.
[39] uses a Markov chain to build a probabilistic model of abnormal events
in network systems to forecast and detect network intrusions. It consists of
three phases. In the ﬁrst phase, the network states, including the outlying
ones, are newly deﬁned by applying a K-means clustering over a training
data set. Based on these states, the second phase computes the state transi-
tion probability matrix and the initial probability distribution of the Markov
model. The third phase computes in real-time the chance of abnormal activ-
ity for online data.
The main advantage of the sequential-based method is the high accuracy
in recognizing attack scenarios, potentially discovering the causal relationship
between alerts. However, the correlation results depends upon the logical
predicates that are deﬁned as well as upon the quality of the sensors.
Case-based methods
Case-based methods rely on a knowledge-base system that represents well-
deﬁned scenarios. The underlying knowledge is built by human or inferred
by adopting machine learning or data mining techniques, and is continuously
updated with the new observed scenarios. When a new case is raised, the
system searches the database for the most similar cases. If a matching case is
found, its associated information is retrieved and used to solve the problem.
If this attempt is successful, proper information on the solution is stored
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for future reuse. Otherwise, the reasons for the failure are identiﬁed and
recorded for the next decisions.
A methodology and language for modeling multistep cyber attack sce-
narios is proposed in [13], that models scenarios as trees. Each scenario is
represented through a set of modules. A module represents an inference step
and consists of three sections: activity, pre and post condition. To support
event-driven inferences, the activity section speciﬁes a list of events to trigger
the module. A library of predicates is deﬁned and used as a vocabulary to
describe the properties of system states and events. Each module is linked
to others through pre/post conditions to recognize attack scenarios.
Some proposals adopt an approach based upon data mining, a set of
techniques and tools to extract and present implicit knowledge. [24] presents
a method to discover, visualize, and predict behavior pattern of attackers
in a network based system. Data mining techniques are applied to generate
association rules, starting from alerts produced by an IDS, and to build
predeﬁned attack scenarios. These scenarios are used to predict multistage
attacks.
Case-based correlation techniques are very eﬀective to solve well-known
problems by specifying appropriate solutions and by discovering new poten-
tial ones. The drawbacks are the complexity of building an exhaustive list
with all the scenarios to build a comprehensive knowledge database and the
low performance that prevents their adoption for real-time correlation.
2.3 The Haruspex suite
The Haruspex suite [7, 8, 9, 10] is a collection of tools that enable security
experts to model threat agents, simulate attacks and choose countermeasures
for a system. Starting from the list of all the vulnerabilities aﬀecting each
node and from the system topology, a module of the suite builds an inter-
nal model of the system. A number of experiments on agents attacks are
implemented through this model by applying a Monte Carlo method. By
collecting proper information in each simulation, a statistical sample is built
and stored in a database. This database stores information on the attacks
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Figure 2.3: The architecture of the Haruspex suite
these agents have implemented, the goals they have reached and the time
this has taken. Other tools use this database to produce statistics to assess
the risk and select countermeasures to be deployed.
The suite introduces several deﬁnitions and features. Here we detail just
some of them.
2.3.1 Kernel modules
The Haruspex suite is composed by several modules, as depicted in Figure
2.3, but the kernel ones are the builder and the engine module.
The builder module
The builder module creates the model of the system, starting from the output
of one or more vulnerabilities scanners, the vulnerabilities the user suspects
will be discovered in the future and the logical system topology. Using this
information, an enumeration of all the elementary attacks to the system
is made, enriched with other information described in the following. Each
vulnerability is classiﬁed using the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposure
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(CVE) database [29, 32], a de facto standard on vulnerability description,
and the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [38]. The information
extracted by the builder are used by other modules of the suite.
The engine module
The engine module implements a Monte Carlo method to produce an as-
sessment database with the statistical sample to support the assessment.
Starting from a description of the attacks to the system previously discov-
ered and one of the agents, a number of experiments are made to simulate
the possible attack chains that the agents can implement against the system.
This number is speciﬁed by the user or is determined on the basis of a user
deﬁned conﬁdence interval on the statistics. Further details on this phase
are explained in the following.
2.3.2 Attacks
An attack is the exploitation of a vulnerability of a component by an agent to
gain new rights or shutdown a service. A component represents a hardware
or software module of the system. A vulnerability is a defect in a compo-
nent or an erroneous or malicious behavior of some users. The considered
vulnerabilities are eﬀective, if already discovered, and potential, if they are
only suspected, so they are paired with the probability distribution of being
discovered at a given time.
An attack is characterized by the target IP, port and the considered pro-
tocol. A further attack attribute is the vulnerability identiﬁer, in the form
of a CVE id. From the vulnerability description in the CVE, the builder
extracts further attributes of the attack, such as the success probability, the
prerequisites and the consequences. These last two attributes represent re-
spectively the rights needed to implement the attack and the rights acquired
if the attack is successful.
The attack previously considered is an elementary one. Instead, a com-
plex attack is the composition of elementary attacks, an attack chain. The
composition has to respect some constraint. First of all, an elementary at-
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tack is never repeated after its success. Then, the ﬁrst attack preconditions
must be included in the initial rights set of an agent. The last constraint is
that a chain should respect attack pre and post condition. This means that
the rights returned by an initial subsequence of the elementary attacks in
the chain deﬁne a set of rights that includes the preconditions of a successive
attack.
2.3.3 Agents
The attackers that try to violate the system are modeled as threat agent, or
simply agent.
The suite considers an intelligent agent that compose elementary attacks
into a complex one to reach some goals. Each goal is a distinct set of rights
that the agent reaches after acquiring all the corresponding rights. Each
right enables the agent to invoke the corresponding operation of a resource,
like turning oﬀ a service, read or write record of a database, being user of a
node, and so on. Obviously, when an agent reaches a goal there is an impact,
that is a loss for the owner of the system.
The user speciﬁes the model of the agent through attributes like the initial
set of rights and resources available, and the set of rights that the attacker
wants to acquire.
Obviously, to eﬀectively model an intelligent attacker, the engine module
has to simulate the possible attack choices that the agent could implement.
To do so, the engine uses an attack graph. Every node of this graph represents
the rights acquired by the attacker when an attack is successful. We can also
distinguish the initial node, the starting point for a chain, and the ﬁnal node,
containing the goals of the agent. The path in the graph from an initial node
to a ﬁnal one basically represents a privilege escalation to reach a goal. This
path also represents the complex attack that the agent has to successfully
implement in order to achieve some goals.
There are also other attributes to better reﬁne the simulation of the most
real behavior of the attacker, by changing the selection of the next attack of
an agent.
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One of the most important ones is the ranking strategy. The agent applies
this strategy to select the sequence of attacks to implement. The strategy
considers attributes such as the success probability, the time to implement
the attacks or the number of rights it grants to the agent. Among the various
strategies an agent can apply, four are the main ones. The Max Probability
one selects the complex attack with the higher probability of success. The
Max Increment one selects the complex attack that returns, if successful,
the largest set of new rights. The Max Eﬃciency one selects the complex
attack with the best ratio between success probability and execution time.
The Smart Subnet First one selects with same probability each elementary
attack, but it assigns a larger priority to attacks that returns rights on another
subnet.
The interesting notion of look-ahead, a positive integer expressing the
quantity of information that an agent uses when has to choose the next attack
to implement, is deﬁned. Typical values are 0, 1 and 2. The next attack is
chosen by considering paths of look-ahead length starting from the node
an agent has reached in the attack graph. Obviously, the look-ahead value
inﬂuences the previously deﬁned ranking strategies. In particular, two cases
may arise. If any ranked attack grants the rights in a goal, then it is returned.
Instead, if, due to a low look-ahead value, the strategy cannot determine a
complex attacks that leads to a goal, then the selection is done according to
the ranking strategies. In this last case, the agent may implement useless
attacks.
The persistence of the attacker is the number of times a failed attack is
repeated before selecting another one.
The continuity is the number of attacks of a chain the agent executes
before invoking again the strategy. This deﬁnes the compromise between
the selection overhead and the ability of executing chains enabled by newly
discovered vulnerabilities.
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2.3.4 Simulations
Coherently with the adoption of the Monte Carlo method, an experiment
includes several, diﬀerent and independent runs. Each run simulates the be-
havior of some agents for the same time interval, together with the discovery
of potential vulnerabilities. A run is subdivided into time steps to analyze
these aspects in the simulated elapsing time. When a run is over, the en-
gine module re-initializes the status of the system and agents to start a new,
independent, run.
At each time step of a run, after determining if some potential vulnera-
bilities are discovered, the engine simulates the behavior of the agents. For
each agent, according to the various parameters previously discussed, the
next attack is chosen, unless the agent has already reached its goal or is busy
because still implementing the previous attack. To select an attack, a subset
of the attack graph is dynamically built, according to the look-ahead value.
Then, the selection of the strategy is evaluated.
At the end of a run, the engine collects the samples that it stores in a
database. Using this database, valuable information is extracted, like the
attack chains, the impact, the attacks probability, the reached goals, the
number of runs where an agent implements a sequence, and the time to
implement a complex attack.
Another very interesting information concerns agent plans. A plan is a
subsequence of an attack chain without useless attacks. An attack is useless
if the agent does not use the rights it grants to reach a goal. Haruspex derives
the corresponding agent plans from each sequence through a backward scan
that removes useless attacks.
Chapter 3
Framework
We present the main problems posed by the design of a SIEM framework and
their solutions. First of all, we describe the general architecture of the pro-
posed SIEM framework and then discuss the details of each module. We also
identify the useful information to be derived from the assessment database
produced by the Haruspex suite.
3.1 Architecture overview
The proposed framework considers as source devices both kind of IDSs, net-
work and host ones. A variety of widely deployed sensors are available oﬀ-the-
shelf, and the proposed framework aims to cooperate with them to simplify
its adoption in real environments. A proper module, the Receiver, collects
the alerts raised from the sensors and maps them into a uniform format the
other modules can understand.
After being processed by the Receiver, the alert has to be validated. The
Filter module implements the validation process and, eventually, ﬁlters out
the alert. Furthermore, this process prevents the overload of the SIEM. If
the alert is not validated, unknown updates or conﬁguration changes to the
target system may have introduced a new vulnerability that may invalidate
the previous assessment. Hence, the alert requires further investigations by
a security expert.
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The Matcher and the Correlator modules process a validated alert.
The Matcher accesses an agent attack patterns database to match the
detected sequence of attacks against the agents patterns and identify the
attackers.
The Correlator correlates the alert with the previous ones. The corre-
lation process basically matches the detected attack sequence against the
simulated ones to discover the complex attacks a set of agents are imple-
menting. The correlation process may produce two distinct outputs.
If the correlation is successful, the Predictor attributes the detected se-
quences to some agents and predicts attacks. The attribution of a detected
sequence to an agent is a valuable information. First of all, this supports
the anticipation of the goals the attacker is trying to achieve. Moreover, we
supply some forensics. Obviously, the prediction of the next attacks of an
agent is useful to stop its attempt and prevent any impact.
If no correlation is possible because of the mismatch between the sequence
and the database, the Investigator module analyzes the previous correlation
result and the current alert to discover 0-day sequences. A 0-day sequence
is a complex attack that has not been simulated but that respects the pre
and post conditions constraints on the attacks in a sequence. However, in
this case we do not know the agent and the Predictor cannot predict future
attacks. The security expert is informed and, eventually, an update to the
Haruspex database may be considered.
Figure 3.1 sketches the whole SIEM architecture.
The following sections describe in more details the SIEM modules. Let
us ﬁrst introduce some hypothesis on sensors.
3.2 Sensors
Each sensor sends alerts to the Receiver module trough a secure channel. We
assume that the sensors detect all the attacks, both remote and local ones,
to the system. This assumes a proper conﬁguration and placement of the
sensors.
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Figure 3.1: The SIEM framework architecture
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Furthermore, we assume the sensors do not miss any attack. This implies
that no false negatives are possible.
We consider two cases, the failure detection and the attack detection one.
The former assumes that the sensors can distinguish successful attack from
failed one. Instead, the latter assumes that the sensors signal attacks without
their outcome.
We discuss the main consequences of the two assumptions in the following.
3.3 Failure detection case
This section assumes that the sensors provide alerts for all known attacks
together with their success or failure.
3.3.1 Building the SIEM database
First of all, the SIEM has to build a database that is the underlying knowl-
edge and the intelligence of the whole framework. This database is produced
from the output of the Haruspex suite, that collects information in multiple
simulations of attacks against the system. The suite discovers both the plans
and the complex attacks of each agent.
The Haruspex suite maps complex attacks of an agent into the corre-
sponding plans. A plan is a subsequence of an attack chain without useless
attacks. Although this seems a useful simpliﬁcation, by pruning some at-
tacks from a sequence we decrease the diﬀerences among the attack chains
of distinct agents. This will aﬀect the attribution and prediction phases,
because the accuracy of these phases increases with the diﬀerence among
attack chains. So, agent plans are not optimal for attack attribution and
forecasting.
A Haruspex complex attack is a simulated sequence of attacks imple-
mented by an agent and contains both successful and failed attacks. If we
denote by atsx the successful implementation of attack x and by at
f,n
x n con-
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secutive failures of attack x, a complex attack may be written as[
atf,21 at
s
1at
s
2at
f,4
3 at
f,3
4 . . .
]
Because the sensors can detect the result of attacks, the alerts for failed
attacks are not interesting because they do not change the security status of
the system. So, we can drop failed attacks from a complex one.
By removing failed attacks from a sequence, the SIEM builds a database
of successful pure sequences. A successful pure sequence is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1. A successful pure sequence is the sequence of elementary at-
tacks extracted from a complex one by removing the failures.
As an example, given the complex attack[
ats54at
f,4
63 at
s
66at
f,2
23 at
s
23at
s
63
]
the corresponding successful pure sequence is
[at54at66at23at63]
We can notice that distinct complex attacks can be mapped into the same
successful pure sequence. As a result, the SIEM pairs each successful pure
sequence sps with the set of agents implementing it and their relative frequen-
cies, that is the number of times the agent implements it in the simulations.
If an agent ag implements sps, we denote its frequency with freq(sps, ag).
We can deﬁne also freq(sps), that is the number of times sps is implemented
by any agents in the simulations.
The SIEM stores this information in the SIEM database.
3.3.2 Receiving and ﬁltering alerts
The Receiver processes each alert to extract the characteristics of the attack.
Distinct sensors can be adopted and each sensor has its own alert format. As
a consequence, the Receiver needs to parse the alert.
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At ﬁrst, the Receiver retrieves the result of the attack. If the alert reports
a failed attack, the Receiver just logs the corresponding information, without
further processing. We can explain this behavior under the assumption that
alerts of failed attacks do not convey useful information. This reduces the
computational load of the whole SIEM.
We have already seen the attributes to identify an elementary attack. This
is also the information the Receiver extracts from an alert. These attributes
are:
• the target IP
• the target port
• the transport protocol
• the set of references to the vulnerabilities exploited, namely the CVE
identiﬁers
From this perspective, we can deﬁne an alert as follows.
Deﬁnition 2. An alert is the notiﬁcation of an alarm raised by a sensor that
has detected a known attack. Basically, an alert is a tuple of
〈IP, port, protocol, {CV Eids}〉
While the ﬁrst three attributes are always meaningful, the last one, the
CVE ids set, may be empty, have a single reference or more than one, because
the sensor generating the alert could not determine which vulnerability has
been exploited. This could happen because no CVE id has been assigned
or because attack vectors are very similar and the sensor could not distin-
guish among the corresponding vulnerabilities. Consider, for example, the
vulnerabilities enabling a SQL Injection attack. Since the query string could
match distinct descriptions, the sensor could not be able to identify which
vulnerability has been exploited.
Trough this information, the Filter ﬁnds the Haruspex elementary attacks
that are compatible with the alert. The matching condition depends upon
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the alert reference set. If this set has at least one CVE id, the Filter applies
the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3. An alert is compatible with an elementary attacks if
(i) the IP, port and protocol are the same
(ii) the attack CVE id is contained in the alert reference set of CVE ids
If the alert reference set is empty, the vulnerability exploited is unknown,
so the Filter cannot apply condition (ii). We consider the worst case scenario,
so potentially, any elementary attack, that respect just condition (i), could
be exploited. As a result, the Filter returns these attacks.
A consequence of the notion of compatibility is that the Filter could map
the alert to a set of Haruspex elementary attacks. This set of attacks may
be empty or include more than one attack. An alert mapped into several
attacks is a source of non determinism that reduces the accuracy of the next
phases.
If an alert is not compatible with any attack, it signals an inconsistency
with the system model of the Haruspex suite. As an example, this may be
due to an unknown update to the system. Further investigations are required,
so the SIEM informs a security expert.
Notice that, since no false positives are possible, if a sensor detects a
successful attack then a vulnerability has been exploited.
If at least one attack is compatible with the alert, the Matcher and the
Correlator modules continue the SIEM processing.
3.3.3 Agent attack patterns recognition
TheMatcher module identiﬁes attacking agents by matching the alert stream
against the pattern of the various agents. A pattern is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 4. A pattern is an ordered sequence of attacks that uniquely
identify an agent.
We can see a pattern as a signature of an attacker.
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First of all, the Matcher builds an agent attack pattern database out of
the SIEM one.
Starting from a successful pure sequence, the Matcher extracts the com-
binations of N attacks by preserving the sequence order. By iterating this
procedure a number of times equal to the length of the extracted sequence,
the Matcher ﬁnds all the combinations for a successful pure sequence. By
applying this method to all the successful pure sequences, the Matcher con-
structs for each agent the corresponding set of attack combinations.
Notice that distinct successful pure sequences can generate the same at-
tack combination. So we can pair each of them with its frequency.
Furthermore, the same attack combination could appear in more than one
agent set, so the Matcher ﬁlters out the combinations that are not unique
for an agent. The resulting sets of attack combinations are the patterns for
the agents. Each pattern is paired with its frequency, the relative attack
combination frequency.
The whole procedure has a large time complexity. The Matcher provides
three mechanisms to cope with this complexity. The user can bound the max
value of N and can set frequency thresholds on both successful pure sequences
and patterns. Obviously, if any of these mechanisms is used, the Matcher
neglects some successful pure sequences and patterns. This decreases the
accuracy of pattern matching and it may result in false positive or false
negative agents identiﬁcation.
On receiving a new set of compatible attacks from the Filter, the Matcher
searches for totally matched patterns. If at least one is found, the correspond-
ing agent is identiﬁed as attacking the system.
We remark that attacking agents are identiﬁed through pattern matching
and attribution. The two processes are diﬀerent, even if they aim to achieve
the same goal. The Matcher analyzes the attack stream, as it is, to recognize
known agent attack patterns. Instead, the Predictor relies on the correla-
tion process to apply both statistical and heuristic methods to identify the
agents. Furthermore, an attribution is paired with a probability value while
no probability can be paired with pattern matching.
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3.3.4 Correlating attacks
The correlation of alerts is one of the most complex SIEM task. The Cor-
relator module implements this functionality by sequentially composing the
alerts received according to the attack chains discovered by simulations. The
correlation result is the input of the Predictor module, that attributes and
predicts agent attacks.
Now we give more details on the correlation process.
For simplicity sake, at ﬁrst we assume that just one agent is attacking
the system, but this agent and its goals are unknown. This means that any
attack the sensors detect belongs to an attack sequence implemented by that
agent.
Informally, the alert stream received up to a given time matches a suc-
cessful pure sequence if each alert of the stream is compatible with the ele-
mentary attacks in the successful pure sequence, and it respects their order.
This matching could be complete, if the condition holds for all the attacks in
the successful pure sequence, or partial, if the condition holds for the ﬁrst n
attacks of the successful pure sequence. This is a preﬁx matching between
alerts and successful pure sequences.
The correlation result is the set of successful pure sequences that match
the alert stream.
On receiving an alert mapped into a set of Haruspex elementary attacks,
the Correlator removes from the previous correlation result all those success-
ful pure sequences that do not match anymore with the alert stream. This
implies that the resulting set could even be empty if no sequence matches
with the alert stream. In this case, no agent has implemented the chain in
a simulation. This signals an inconsistency, and the Investigator module is
invoked to distinguish between 0-day sequence and completely unexpected
attack chains.
Now we extend the correlation process to the one where some agents
attack the system simultaneously. This is the most general situation that
also covers the previous case. So, it is also the default behavior of the SIEM.
If several agents are concurrently attacking the system, the alert stream is
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the ordered interleaving of attacks in the sequences of these agents. Since we
assume these agents cannot cooperate, each attack in the ordered interleaving
is implemented by exactly one agent and the rights it grants are acquired
only by this agent. Obviously, the agents and their goals are not known in
advance.
Here, each alert of the stream has to be compatible with and in the same
order of the ordered interleaving of attacks of a successful pure sequence set.
We can notice that the combinations of distinct successful pure sequences
may generate the same ordered interleaving.
Consider, as an example, three successful pure sequences of distinct agents.
The ﬁrst one, sps1, is at1at3at5, the second one, sps2, is at2at4at6, and the
third one, sps3, is at1at2at3at4. If the detected alert stream das is mapped
into at1at2at3, it is obvious that das could be the ordered interleaving of sps1
and sps2, or the single sps3.
As a consequence, more than one set of successful pure sequences could
verify the matching condition. In the previous example, we have two sets.
One includes sps1 and sps2, while the other one only includes sps3.
An interesting property is that if an alert mapped into the same elemen-
tary attack is received more than one time, it will be matched with at least
two diﬀerent successful pure sequences. We can prove this property by the
assumption that a single attack chain never repeats a successful attack.
Moreover, these successful pure sequences can be grouped by the agent
that implements them.
The consequence of all these hypotheses is that the correlation process
returns a set of tuples, each with two components for each attacking agent.
The ﬁrst component represents the contribution of that agent to the alert
stream, while the second is the set of the relative matching successful pure
sequences. Because of this interpretation, each of these tuples represents the
security status of the system, that is a distinct and alternative explanation
of the ordered interleaving.
Deﬁnition 5. If naa denotes the number of attacking agents, coni the i -th
agent contribution and comppseqi the matching successful pure sequences set
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that have coni as preﬁx, an explanation is a tuple with the structure
〈< con1, comppseq1 >ag1 , . . . , < connaa, comppseqnaa >agnaa〉
At high level, the correlation process may be seen as the computation of
a new set of explanations out of the previous alerts and the received one.
For each explanation, the Correlator checks if at least one successful pure
sequence of an agent still matches the received alert and, in this case, it builds
a new explanation. This explanation is equal to the previous one for all the
agents but the considered one. The component of the agent is replaced by
the new contribution (the previous one plus this alert) and the new matching
successful pure sequence set. Implicitly, the Correlator assumes that the
agent has implemented the attack that has been detected.
The Correlator repeats this procedure for each component of the expla-
nation.
The Correlator also handles a special case where the received alert is
compatible with an initial attack that is the ﬁrst attack of a complex one.
Here, the Correlator determines the set of successful pure sequences that
have the ﬁrst attack compatible with the alert and groups this set by the
implementing agent.
For each explanation, the Correlator builds a new one. This explanation
is equal to the previous one for all the agents but the one that initiates a new
sequence. The component of the agent is replaced by the received alert as
contribution and the relative successful pure sequence set as matching one.
If the agent component was not empty, the Correlator stores the previous
information as history of the explanation. To explain this solution consider
that an agent could interrupt a previous attack chain to implement a new
one.
As a consequence, the complexity of the correlation process increases with
the number of agents attacking the system simultaneously. Fortunately, we
can assume that the probability that n agents attack simultaneously the
system strongly decrease with n. This makes it possible to bound the number
of components, and of concurrent attackers, of explanations. This reduces
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the complexity while introducing the possibility of error in the correlation
result. Because the Predictor and the Investigator rely on this explanations
set, this could also result in a loss of accuracy of attribution, prediction, and
0-day discovery.
Anyway, by focusing on the sequences an agent actually implements, the
proposed approach increases the accuracy of the correlation with respect to
approaches that adopt an attack graph to describe all the sequences an agent
may implement.
All the new explanations computed by the Correlator compose the new
explanation set. If it is not empty, this set can be analyzed by the Predic-
tor to attribute and predict attacks. Otherwise, the Investigator module is
invoked to process the previous explanation set and the actual alert in order
to discover further information.
3.3.5 Attributing and predicting attacks
The Predictor implements both attack attribution and prediction. The ﬁrst
one identiﬁes the agent that is implementing the detected attack chain, while
the second one forecasts future attacks of the agents that are currently at-
tacking the system.
As attribution and prediction are probabilistic, they could be aﬀected by
the a priori estimate of the probabilities that each modeled agent attacks
the systems. This estimate could be supplied by the user as input, but it is
not derivable by the Haruspex output database. The attacking probability of
each agent is a very critical information, because every statistic is conditioned
by the a priori probability that each agent is actually attacking the system.
As a consequence, the Predictor must be aware if these probabilities are
known or not.
The Predictor tries to pair each explanation with its probability, that is
the likelihood of the security status represented by the explanation.
The probability of each explanation can be computed in two cases only.
In the ﬁrst one the user supplies the a priori estimate of the agents attacking
probabilities, in the other one all the explanations have the same set of
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attacking agents. In all the other cases, the probability of each explanation
cannot be computed, because each one considers distinct agents that could
be not actually attacking the system.
In the ﬁrst case, the user supplies the attacking probabilities of each agent.
We denote with P(ag) this probability for the agent ag.
The Predictor queries the SIEM database and retrieves freq(sps, ag) and
freq(sps) for each successful pure sequence sps of an explanation expl.
The Predictor evaluates the probability that an agent ag is involved in
an explanation expl as
P (ag, expl) =
∑
sps∈expl freq(sps, ag)∑
sps∈expl freq(sps)
· P (ag)
From this probability, the Predictor computes the relative probability of the
explanation expl as
Prel(expl) =
∏
ag∈expl
P (ag, expl)
Obviously, this probability has to be normalized with those of other expla-
nations, so the Predictor computes the real explanation probability as
P (expl) =
Prel(expl)∑
expl Prel(expl)
The second case is one of the two previously mentioned, namely the one
where all the explanations produced by the correlation phase involve the same
agents as currently attacking the system. This means that the Predictor is
sure that all these agents attack the system. As a consequence, it applies
the previous reasoning to compute the probability of each explanation by
considering the P(ag) equal to 1 for any agents.
These probability of each explanation will be used both to attribute and
predict attacks. If the Predictor cannot compute them, it adopts some heuris-
tics to extract some information.
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Attack attribution
We consider at ﬁrst the solution to the attribution problem.
This solution pairs each agent with the probability that is actually at-
tacking the system given the detected sequence of attacks.
If the Predictor has computed P(expl), the attribution probability of an
agent is simply the sum of the explanation probability where the agent ap-
pears.
Pattr(ag) =
∑
ag∈expl
P (expl)
Otherwise, the Predictor applies a simple heuristic. If an agent ag is
present in all explanations, its Pattr(ag) is equal to 1, otherwise it is undeﬁned.
This is justiﬁed by the fact that we are sure that an agent that appears in
each explanation is attacking the system, while the Predictor cannot say
anything about the others. Notice that this can be deduced from the second
case to compute of the probability of an explanation previously described.
We deﬁne the result of the attribution process in the following way.
Deﬁnition 6. If we denote with na the number of agents and with Pattr(agi)
the attribution probability of the agent i computed as previously described,
the attribution is a tuple with the structure
〈Pattr(ag1), . . . , Pattr(agna)〉
Prediction computation
We describe now how a prediction is computed.
In principle, a prediction is a set of couples, each deﬁning an attack
and the probability it will detected as the next one. This holds if there
is a single attacker, but we are considering a more complex scenario where
distinct agents are concurrently attacking the system. As a consequence, the
observed alert stream is the ordered interleaving of the attack sequences of
some agents. Under these assumptions, the Predictor cannot predict in any
way who implements the next attack. The Predictor can just anticipate the
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behavior, so future attacks, of a single agent. Hence, the prediction will be
deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 7. If we denote with na the number of agents and with napsagi
the set of next attacks probabilities for the agent i composed by couples of
〈atx, Pnext(atx)〉
where atx is an attack x and Pnext(atx) is the probability of the attack x to
be the next one, the prediction is a tuple of
〈napsag1 , . . . , napsagna〉
Obviously, a prediction strongly depends upon the explanations that the
Correlator returns, because they describe the last attacks implemented by
the agents in their sequences, so the Predictor can reason on the next attacks.
Because each explanation is alternative to the others, the Predictor computes
a prediction for each explanation and it may associate each prediction with a
probability. This probability is equal to the relative P(expl), if the Predictor
has been able to compute them, and it is undeﬁned otherwise.
The Predictor computes Pnext(atx) in the following way.
Each explanation includes, for an agent ag, its contribution conag and
its set of matching successful pure sequences comppseqag that have conag
as preﬁx. Starting from this information, the Predictor determines, for each
successful pure sequence sps in comppseqag, the last attack atlast implemented
by ag as the last attack of conag in sps. The attack atx immediately following
atlast in sps will be the next attack of the relative ag. Moreover, atx could be
shared among distinct successful pure sequences of the agent. The Predictor
computes Pnext(atx) as a weighted average.
If we denote with next(sps, atx) the predicate that indicates if atx is the
next attack of sps, Pnext(atx) is deﬁned as
Pnext(atx) =
∑
next(sps,atx)
freq(sps, ag)∑
sps freq(sps, ag)
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By collecting these probabilities for all the next attacks of an agent ag,
the Predictor computes the napsag previously described. By applying this
procedure for each agent of the explanation, the Predictor computes the
relative prediction.
Notice that the next attack atx of a successful pure sequence is the next
one that characterizes the privilege escalation an attacker implements to
reach its goals. So, the prediction process discovers the next attacks that an
attacker has to successfully implement to achieve its goals. It also pairs these
attacks with their probability of a future exploitation.
While the attribution returns a single result for all the explanation set,
the prediction returns a set of predictions, one for each distinct explanation
in the current security status of the system.
In the attribution process, the P(expl) support a more accurate estima-
tion of agents attribution probabilities. Anyway, even if P(expl) cannot be
computed, the Predictor can apply heuristics to product results that are
accurate and valuable.
The prediction set is always computed but, without P(expl), the Predictor
cannot compute the most likelihood forecast.
From a concrete security perspective, the Predictor produces very inter-
esting results for the real-time prevention of impact. By attributing attacks
to an agent we can also discover its goals, so that the SIEM can reduce or
even completely avoid the impact by stopping some of the attacks the agent
needs to reach a goal.
3.3.6 Discovery of 0-day
When the correlation process cannot return a result, the Investigator tries
to discover further information on the last alert received. In particular, the
Investigator can discover a 0-day sequence out of the last valid correlation
result and the actual alert. The whole process is based on the pre and post
conditions of elementary attacks.
We ﬁrst deﬁne the sequence rights that is the rights set that an agent can
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acquire by implementing a sequence of attacks.
Deﬁnition 8. A sequence rights is the set of rights granted by an attack
sequence if all its attacks are successful. If as[i] denotes the i -th attack of
the attack sequence as, len(as) the length of the attack sequence as, and
post(at) the postconditions of an attack at, the sequence rights sr(as) of as
is the union of all the postconditions, that is
sr(as) =
len(as)⋃
i=0
{post(as[i])}
The Investigator has to consider all the explanations in the last valid cor-
relation result, because each codiﬁes distinct and alternative security status
of the system. Each explanation stores the contribution of each attacker to
the alert stream. Under the assumption that the agents do not cooperate, a
contribution represents the sequence of successfully attacks by an attacker.
In this way, the Investigator ﬁnds the sequence rights of the contribution to
deduce the rights an agent acquires.
Given the right set of the contribution and the initial rights of an agent,
the Investigator computes the union of these two sets as the global rights the
agent acquires at the time.
We recall that the actual alert is mapped into a set of Haruspex elemen-
tary attacks where each attack has its own preconditions.
Furthermore, a vulnerability has enabled the attack causing the alert and
it can be exploited because the attack sequence of an agent grants the proper
rights.
The Investigator checks if the rights of the agent includes the precondition
of a mapped attack. If at least one attack veriﬁes this condition, the alert
satisﬁes the post and pre conditions ordering, so the Investigator identiﬁes
a possible 0-day sequence of the agent, namely a sequence the agent has not
selected in any simulation.
If, instead, no contribution of an agent to an explanation satisﬁes the
previous condition, the Investigator deduces that the attack chain is not
consistent with the system model of the Haruspex suite. This could mean
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that either the agent has exploited, before this detected attack, a 0-day
vulnerability (that cannot be detected by deﬁnition), or unknown updates
to the target system, e.g. the insertion of a new LAN node, have introduced
further vulnerabilities.
The Investigator ﬁnds other useful information by further investigations.
By considering information on the topology of the target system, the
Investigator determines the set of nodes where the 0-day vulnerability could
have been exploited.
Furthermore, by considering pre and post conditions, the Investigator
computes the diﬀerence between the preconditions of the attacks mapped
from the alert and the global rights. This is the set of rights that the 0-day
vulnerability could have granted to an agent. Similar reasoning are applied
to the sequences rights of the contributions. Here, the Investigator identiﬁes
the set of rights granted by the 0-day vulnerability with respect to attack
chains, rather than to the privilege escalation the agent actually attempts.
As a result, the output of the Investigator helps the security experts in the
analysis of the unexpected attacks to the system, both for system hardening
and vulnerabilities discovery.
3.4 Attack detection
This section highlights the main diﬀerences of the framework with respect
to the previous case. Now the sensors cannot distinguish successful attacks
from failed ones. This is the most general case.
The new SIEM database
Since the sensors cannot determine the result of the attacks, the previous
Deﬁnition 1 of successful pure sequence has to be generalized to take into
account the repetition of attacks due to failures.
A complex attack may execute each attack a variable number of times that
depends upon an agent attribute as well as on the simulation randomization.
We deﬁne the general pure sequence as follows.
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Deﬁnition 9. A pure sequence is the sequence of elementary attacks ex-
tracted from a complex attack, by removing consecutive repetition of the
same attacks.
As an example, if the complex attack is[
ats54at
f,4
63 at
s
66at
f,2
23 at
s
23at
s
63
]
the corresponding pure sequence is
[at54at63at66at23at63]
As a consequence, the length of a pure sequence is equal to or larger than
the one of the successful pure sequence extracted from the same complex
attack.
The SIEM database is built in the same way as before, but now the SIEM
considers pure sequences rather than successful ones.
Alerts collection and ﬁltering
The Receiver still collects alerts from the sensors, but now it cannot retrieve
the result of the attacks. As a consequence, any received alert must be parsed
and sent to the Filter module.
This implies that the whole SIEM has to process a larger number of alerts
than in the previous case.
Furthermore, if the Filter ﬁnds no matching attacks, it could signal an
inconsistency, but also a false positive. This may be due to several reasons.
A possible example is the one where the attacker lacks of information on the
LAN node to attack, so it exploits the wrong vulnerability.
Pattern recognition
The Matcher builds its agent pattern database as previously described, but
this time it considers pure sequences.
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Because pure sequences are longer than successful ones, the complexity
of pattern extraction increases, both from the time perspective and from the
number of patterns generated.
The larger complexity also aﬀects the matching pattern search.
Attack correlation
The Correlator just considers pure sequences instead of successful ones. The
whole correlation process does not change even if its complexity increases
because of attack repetitions.
Consider, as an example, a pure sequence ps where the attack atx is the
last one matched. If the actual received alert is mapped into a set of attacks
that contains atx, it still matches ps. As a consequence, ps participates at
least to the next correlation.
Furthermore, ps could appear in distinct explanations that belong to the
new explanations set.
Furthermore, consider the following case. Two pure sequences, ps1 and
ps2, have the same last matched attack, atx, and belong to two distinct
compatible pure sequence sets of distinct agents. The consecutive repetitions
of an alert compatible with atx will be matched with ps1, or ps2, or both. As a
consequence, if that alert is received two times, the Correlator generates three
explanations. Two that represent the doubly matching for, respectively, ps1
and ps2, and one that represents one match for ps1 and one for ps2. Basically,
this results from the combination of the alerts on the pure sequences of
distinct agents. Obviously, this reasoning can be extended to a larger number
of pure sequences and consecutive alerts.
All these considerations result in an increase in the number of compatible
pure sequences and in the one of explanations.
Hence, the complexity of correlation strongly increases. However, the
security status that is represented could not change signiﬁcantly because the
last attack of a pure sequence that is matched could be the same one as in
the previous correlation.
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Attribution and prediction
Attribution and prediction work as previously, because the explanation struc-
ture and meaning are not modiﬁed. Anyway, the Predictor complexity in-
creases because the larger cardinality of the explanation set.
The main diﬀerence is in the interpretation of the prediction that now
returns the next attacks of the agent and these attacks may even fail. As a
consequence, we have a more general view of attack forecast.
0-day discovery
In case of mismatch in the correlation process, the Investigator performs
further investigation to discover a 0-day sequence.
Now the contribution represents the sequence of potentially successfully
attacks by an attacker, so the Investigator has to consider anyway all the
attacks of the contribution to compute the sequence rights of Deﬁnition 8.
This could lead to a set of acquired rights larger than the set of rights the
attacker gains, so it could impair the 0-day sequence discovery capability of
the framework.
We can derive a general conclusion from all these diﬀerences with the
previous case. The lack of information on the result of the attacks aﬀect
both the performance and accuracy of the SIEM.
Chapter 4
Implementation
This chapter outlines a prototype implementation of the proposed framework
and details its main algorithms and data structures.
4.1 Data structures
This sections details the two main data structures. The ﬁrst one is the
Pattern Pool that enables theMatcher to match the agent pattern set against
the alert stream. The other data structure, the Pure Sequence Trie, is used
by the Correlator, the Predictor and the Investigator.
4.1.1 Pattern Pool
A pattern is a sequence of attacks that uniquely identify an agent. The
Matcher matches a set of patterns against the alert stream to identify the
corresponding agent. Since the alert stream may be the ordered interleaving
of the attacks of distinct agents, the attacks matching a pattern do not have
to be consecutive in the stream. In other words, in between each matched
attack of a pattern, we may have a number of attacks that are not meaningful
for this pattern but match other patterns.
This problem is known in the literature as the multi-pattern matching
with variable length of do not cares.
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Since we have to match each pattern attack by attack, we adopt a sim-
pliﬁed version of [26, 50].
The Pattern Pool is a data structure that supports the simultaneous
matching of a set of patterns. It is an array with one element for each agent.
PP[ag] denotes the element of the array for agent ag. Each element is an
hash table indexed by the attack identiﬁer. The value associated with each
key atk is the set of patterns that have atk as the next attack to match.
PP[ag][atk] denotes this set of patterns.
The Pattern Pool represents each pattern as a couple with the structure
〈pat, j〉
This couple denotes that the pattern pat is matched till the j -th attack, and
represents the pattern status.
Algorithm 4.1 shows the initialization of the Pattern Pool.
The BuildEmptyPatternPool function allocates in memory the data struc-
ture. Then, for each agent element ag and for each atk, PP[ag][atk] is asso-
ciated with the empty set.
The last loop distributes the patterns in the PP. For each pattern pat
of ag in the agentPatternSet, the algorithm adds the couple 〈pat, 0〉 to the
corresponding set PP[ag][pat[0]]. Here and in the following, pat[i] indicates
the i -th+1 attack of the pattern pat. So, pat[0] is the ﬁrst attack of pat.
At the end, the procedure returns the initialized PP with the initial
matching status of each pattern.
Algorithm 4.5 shows how the Matcher matches patterns against the alert
stream.
4.1.2 Pure Sequence Trie
The Pure Sequence Trie (PST) is the main in-memory data structure of the
current implementation. It is used by the Correlator, the Predictor and the
Investigator.
To choose the actual representation of this data structure, ﬁrst of all we
consider that it represents the agPureSequenceDB, a database that stores the
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Algorithm 4.1 Initialization of the Pattern Pool
Input: agentPatternSet, the set of agent patterns
1: PP ← BuildEmptyPatternPool()
2: for all ag in agentSet do
3: for all atk in attackSet do
4: PP [ag][atk]← ∅
5: end for
6: end for
7: for all (ag, pat) in agentPatternSet do
8: Add(PP [ag][pat[0]], (pat, 0))
9: end for
10: return PP
pure sequences implemented by the agents and their frequency. Each pure
sequence is a sequence of attacks and its preﬁx may be shared with a set
of distinct pure sequences. Furthermore, the matching of the alert stream
against a set of pure sequences resembles a preﬁx matching.
These considerations resulted in the selection of an ordered tree or trie
data structure, where each trie node represents a pure sequence preﬁx p. So,
a node is connected to its children through the set of pure sequences that
share p. A node includes some pointers that are labeled with the next attack
atk of p. So, each child represents the pure sequence set that share the preﬁx
p;atk. This reduces both memory requirements as well as the time to retrieve
matching pure sequences.
As far as concerns the correlation process, our main concern is the se-
quential composition of alert to match a pure sequence set. By using the
described trie, this process can be implemented by following a path in the
trie. The path is determined according to the sequence of attacks compatible
with each alert of the stream. Furthermore, to simplify the computation of
an explanation, a node identiﬁes both the contribution and the matching
pure sequence set of an agent. As a consequence, each explanation includes
pointers to trie nodes. This proves that the trie can eﬃciently support the
correlation.
In its execution, the Correlator may need to send pointers to trie nodes
to the Predictor and the Investigator. As a consequence, each node stores
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information that also support attribution, prediction, and investigation. In
particular, each node stores:
• children, the hash table indexed by the next attacks of the preﬁx. It
links the node to its children,
• preﬁxFreq, the frequency of the preﬁx,
• agPreﬁxFreq[ag], the frequency of the preﬁx for each agent ag,
• agNextAtkFreq[ag][atk], the frequency of the next attacks atk of each
agent ag,
• acquiredRightSet, the right set that an agent that reaches the node
acquires.
We will see in the following how the various task use each information.
This data structure is shared among several activities. However, since no
activity updates the structure, it cannot become a bottleneck for the parallel
computation.
The Pure Sequence Trie implements the described trie. Algorithm 4.2
details its construction.
First of all, the function BuildEmptyPSTrie allocates the memory for an
empty trie.
For each pure sequence ps, the algorithm applies a common schema for
trie construction. Starting from the root, either it accesses an existing node
or creates a new one by following the path determined by each attack atk in
ps.
The function GetOrAddChild returns the child of node labeled with the
attack atk if it was already created, otherwise it allocates a new node for
atk and appends it to the children of node. Moreover, if the failureDetection
parameter is set to false, the new node has a self transition to itself, obviously
labeled with atk. This is useful in the correlation process to take repeated
attacks. The function also initializes the acquiredRightSet to the union of the
acquiredRightSet of the parent node and the postconditions granted by atk.
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Then, the algorithm updates the frequencies with the functionsUpdateNex-
tAtkFreq, UpdateAgFreq and UpdateFreq. The frequencies are always in-
creased by a psFreq factor, the frequency of the pure sequence. Obviously, the
algorithm updates the next attack frequency of the parent, while it increases
the preﬁx frequency of the agent and the one of the child.
Finally, the algorithm returns the pure sequence trie it has built.
Algorithm 4.2 Pure sequence trie construction
Input: agPureSequenceDB, the database of pure sequences;
failureDetection, a boolean value representing if the sensors de-
termine the attack result
1: psTrie← BuildEmptyPSTrie()
2: for all (ag, ps, psFreq) in agPureSequenceDB do
3: node← GetRoot(psTrie)
4: child← null
5: for all atk in ps do
6: child← GetOrAddChild(node, atk, post(atk), failureDetection)
7: UpdateNextAtkFreq(node, ag, atk, psFreq)
8: UpdateAgFreq(child, ag, psFreq)
9: UpdateFreq(child, psFreq)
10: node← child
11: end for
12: end for
13: return psTrie
4.2 Algorithms
This section outlines the main algorithms in the current prototype of the
discussed framework.
4.2.1 Pure sequence database construction
Algorithm 4.3 shows that the computation of the pure sequence database is
very simple. Each record of this database stores information on the agent
ag that implements a pure sequence ps with a frequency psFreq. As a conse-
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quence, each record has the following structure
〈ag, ps, psFreq〉
The algorithm computes this database from the Haruspex complex attack
database complexAttackDB.
From each complex attack ca, the function GetPureSequence computes
the corresponding pure sequence ps. Depending upon the failureDetection
parameter, the failed attacks may be removed from ca. This computes the
corresponding successful or generalized pure sequence ps.
Given ps and the agent ag implementing it, the function AddOrUpdate-
Freq searches the record where ag implements ps in agPureSequenceDB. If it
is found, the function increments by one its frequency psFreq. Otherwise, it
inserts the record 〈ag, ps, 1〉 into the pure sequence database.
Finally, the algorithm returns the complete agPureSequenceDB.
Algorithm 4.3 SIEM database construction
Input: complexAttackDB, the database of Haruspex complex attacks;
failureDetection, a boolean value that represents if the sensors deter-
mine the attack result
Output: agPureSequenceDB, the database of pure sequences
1: agPureSequenceDB ← ∅
2: for all (ag, ca) in complexAttackDB do
3: ps← GetPureSequence(ca, failureDetection)
4: AddOrUpdateFreq(agPureSequenceDB, ag, ps)
5: end for
6: return agPureSequenceDB
4.2.2 Agent pattern set construction
In the following, we present the Algorithm 4.4 to build the agent pattern set.
The algorithm examines each pure sequence ps in the agent pure sequence
database agPureSequenceDB.
If the frequency psFreq of a pure sequence is larger than a threshold
psThreshold, the functionGetAllAtkCombinationsuses the corresponding pure
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sequence ps to extract all the attack combinations with a length from 1 to
N, the upper bound on the length of a combination.
The function AddOrUpdateFreq inserts an attack combination atkComb
for agent ag into the agentPatternSet with as frequency psFreq, if agentPat-
ternSet does not include it. Otherwise, the frequency of atkComb for ag is
increased by psFreq. This takes into account that a pure sequence ps with
frequency psFreq generates an attack combination psFreq times.
Finally, the functions FilterAtkComb and FilterNotUniqueAtkComb re-
move from the agentPatternSet, respectively, the attack combinations with a
frequency lower than patThreshold and that are not unique for an agent.
After executing the two functions, the algorithm returns the resulting
agentPatternSet.
Algorithm 4.4 Agent pattern set construction
Input: agPureSequenceDB, the database of pure sequences; N , the max
length of a pattern; psThreshold, the threshold to apply to pure sequence
frequency; patThreshold, the threshold to apply to pattern frequency
Output: agentPatternSet, the set of agent patterns
1: agentPatternSet← ∅
2: for all (ag, ps, psFreq) in agPureSequenceDB do
3: if psFreq > psThreshold then
4: for all atkComb in GetAllAtkCombinations(ps,N) do
5: AddOrUpdateFreq(agentPatternSet, ag, atkComb, psFreq)
6: end for
7: end if
8: end for
9: FilterAtkComb(agentPatternSet, patThreshold)
10: FilterNotUniqueAtkComb(agentPatternSet)
11: return agentPatternSet
The overall complexity depends upon not only the main loop, but also
upon the inner one, even if its complexity is bound by the user choice of N.
Since their iterations are independent, both loops can exploit any available
parallelism. The only serialization point may arise because the function Ad-
dOrUpdateFreq may extract the same attack combination from distinct pure
sequences. As a consequence, the agentPatternSet has to support concurrent
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accesses.
4.2.3 Agent pattern matching
For each alert validated by the Filter, the Matcher runs the Algorithm 4.5,
that updates the pattern status of unidentiﬁed agents to discover them.
For each validated alert al, CompAtkSet returns a non empty set of com-
patible elementary attacks. Each compatible attack atk matches the patterns
in PP[ag][atk]. The algorithm examines this set to update their status and
ﬁnd totally matched patterns.
For each couple 〈pat, j〉 in PP[ag][atk], the algorithm considers two cases.
If j+1 is equal to the pattern length len(pat), the pattern is totally matched.
Here, the algorithm invokes MarkAsIdentiﬁedAndSignal that stops the com-
putation, marks ag as identiﬁed and signals it to the user. Otherwise,
pat[j+1] is the next attack to match, so we add 〈pat, j + 1〉 to the corre-
sponding PP[ag][pat[j+1]].
We can notice that the attack pat[j+1] could be a compatible attack of
the alert. This attack will be considered later to update pattern status. As
a consequence, the algorithm delays the insertion to avoid any interference
with other PP[ag][atk] sets.
When all the attacks in CompAtkSet(al) have been processed, the algo-
rithm completes any delayed insertion.
This procedure is repeated for each agent that has not already been iden-
tiﬁed.
Notice that the algorithm can easily exploit any available parallelism. The
most complex computation is the loop to update each pattern status, where
each pair is independent from the others. As a consequence, this process can
be implemented in parallel.
4.2.4 Correlation
The Correlator executes the Algorithm 4.6 to correlate each validated alert
with the previous ones.
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Algorithm 4.5 Pattern matching algorithm
Input: al, the actual alert
Output: the identiﬁed agents, if any
1: for all ag not already marked as identiﬁed do
2: for all atk in CompAtkSet(al) do
3: tmp← PP [ag][atk]
4: PP [ag][atk]← ∅
5: for all (pat, j) in tmp do
6: if j + 1 == len(pat) then
7: MarkAsIdentifiedAndSignal(ag)
8: else
9: PostponedAdd(PP [ag][pat[j + 1]], (pat, j + 1))
10: end if
11: end for
12: end for
13: CommitAdds(ag)
14: end for
The Correlator sequentially composes the alerts by traversing the Pure
Sequence Trie. Starting from a node, the Correlator reaches a new node
by following the links in the children hash table. The link to follow is de-
termined by the correspondence between the label of a link and the attack
compatible with an alert. Since an alert can be compatible with a set of
distinct elementary attacks, the Correlator can reach distinct nodes in the
trie. This implies that the algorithm has to consider a set of nodes rather
than a single one.
The prevState is an internal variable of the Correlator and represents the
set of explanations computed through the previous alert. It is initialized to
the set that only includes an empty explanation.
Algorithm 4.6 processes each explanation expl of prevState. It computa-
tion consists of two steps.
The ﬁrst one considers the case where the received alert al is compatible
with an initial attack.
The predicate IsCompatibleWithInitialAtk checks if al is compatible with
at least one attack that is initial for a sequence. This can be done by match-
ing the CompAtkSet(al) against the children of the trie root. If al is com-
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patible with an initial attack, the algorithm invokes GetInitAgNodeSet that
returns a set of couple. Each couple associates an agent ag with the set of
nodes initPSTNodeSet labeled with an attack compatible with al and with
the children of the trie root. For each couple, the algorithm may build a
new explanation newExpl equal to expl, but where the component of ag is
replaced by initPSTNodeSet. Then, the algorithm inserts this explanation
into newState. According to the framework, this has to be done only if the
number of attacking agents involved in an explanation is not larger than a
threshold maxCA. Anyway, if ag already belongs to expl, the building of new-
Expl does not increase the number of attacking agents because we replace its
component.
The second step considers each component of an explanation expl that
refers to an agent ag. Here, the algorithm computes the possible extension to
an agent sequence. Obviously, this cannot be done for the empty explanation.
For each agent ag in an explanation expl, the algorithm tries to extend the
set of nodes pstNodeSet that represents the sequence actually implemented.
The algorithm evaluates the predicate IsExtendableFor that is true only if
the alert al is compatible with at least one next attack of ag in any node
in pstNodeSet. If IsExtendableFor is true, GetExtNodeSet returns a set new-
PSTNodeSet that includes the children nodes of nodes in pstNodeSet that
are compatible with the alert and implemented by ag. Then, the algorithm
transmits this information to BuildNewExpl to build a new explanation and
inserts it into the newState. Since it replaces an agent component, the algo-
rithm does not need to check the number of attacking agents in expl.
Finally, if newState is not empty, it is copied into prevState variable and
it is returned.
Distinct explanations can be analyzed in parallel because the correspond-
ing computations are independent. Furthermore, also each step can be par-
allelized. The algorithm can access the trie nodes in parallel because they
are not updated. A centralization point arises because of the computation of
newState. The corresponding implementation has to support the concurrent
insertion of explanations by avoiding as much as possible the use of locks.
CHAPTER 4. IMPLEMENTATION 56
Algorithm 4.6 Correlation algorithm
Input: al, the received alert
Output: newState, the new set of explanations
1: newState← ∅
2: for all expl in prevState do
3: if IsCompatibleWithInitialAtk(al) then
4: for all (ag, initPSTNodeSet) in GetInitAgNodeSet(al) do
5: if ag ∈ expl OR AttackingAgents(expl) < maxCA then
6: newExpl← BuildNewExpl(expl, ag, initPSTNodeSet)
7: Add(newExpl, newState)
8: end if
9: end for
10: end if
11: for all (ag, pstNodeSet) in expl do
12: if IsExtendableFor(pstNodeSet, al, ag) then
13: newPSTNodeSet← GetExtNodeSet(pstNodeSet, al, ag)
14: newExpl← BuildNewExpl(expl, ag, newPSTNodeSet)
15: Add(newExpl, newState)
16: end if
17: end for
18: end for
19: if newState is not empty then
20: prevState← newState
21: end if
22: return newState
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4.2.5 Attribution and Prediction
The Predictor applies Algorithm 4.7 to attribute and predict attacks.
First of all, ComputeExplProb computes the probability of each explana-
tion. According to the framework, this function returns meaningful values if
either the user deﬁnes agAtkProb, the attacking probability of each agent, or
if all the explanations in explSet involve the same set of agents. Otherwise,
explProb is undeﬁned.
The computation of the probability of each explanation requires the agent
preﬁx frequency and the total preﬁx frequency. We recall that an explanation
includes a set of couples, where each couple deﬁnes an agent ag and the set of
trie nodes representing the matching sequences actually implemented by ag.
Each trie node includes both the frequencies of interest in the agPreﬁxFreq[ag]
and preﬁxFreq variables. So, this computation is very simple.
After the initialization of attr, the attribution is computed. If explProb
is deﬁned, the attribution for agent ag is the sum of the probabilities expl-
Prob[expl] of the explanations expl that involve ag. Otherwise, a strategy is
applied that is implemented by function AgentInAll. This function returns
the set of agents involved in each explanation. To implement the adopted
strategy, the function Attribute pairs each agent in this set with a probability
equal to 1, while other agents have undeﬁned attribution probability.
Then, the algorithm computes the prediction. First of all, it initializes
the set predSet to empty. For each explanation expl in the set explSet, Com-
putePrediction computes the prediction for expl and associates each predic-
tion with the corresponding probability. If the probability is computed it is
equal to explProb[expl], undeﬁned otherwise.
Notice that the prediction by ComputePrediction uses the information in
the nodes associated with ag. In particular, it needs the preﬁx frequency
of each agent and the one of the next attack. These values are stored, re-
spectively, in the agPreﬁxFreq[ag] and the agNextAtkFreq[ag][atk] variables
of each trie node.
The function ComputeExplProb can be easily parallelized, because the
computation of the probability of each explanation is independent from those
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Algorithm 4.7 Attribution and prediction
Input: explSet, the set of explanations computed by the Correlator
Output: attr, the attribution; predSet, the set of prediction
1: explProb← ComputeExplProb(explSet, agAtkProb)
2: attr ← InitAttribution()
3: if explProb is deﬁned then
4: for all expl in explSet do
5: for all ag in expl do
6: attr[ag] = attr[ag] + explProb[expl]
7: end for
8: end for
9: else
10: agSet← AgentInAll(explSet)
11: attr ← Attribute(agSet)
12: end if
13: predSet← ∅
14: for all expl in explSet do
15: pred← ComputePrediction(expl)
16: if explProb is deﬁned then
17: Add(predSet, pred, explProb[expl])
18: else
19: Add(predSet, pred, undefined)
20: end if
21: end for
22: return attr and predSet
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of the others. Furthermore, attribution and prediction can be executed in
parallel.
Attribution can be implemented according to a reduce parallel paradigm.
Instead, prediction can be implemented through a map parallel paradigm,
because the computation of a prediction is independent from the others. The
parallelism of the prediction only requires the support of parallel insertions
into predSet.
4.2.6 Investigation
Algorithm 4.8 shows the algorithm the Investigator executes each time it is
invoked. According to the framework, it needs the last valid explanation set
lastState computed by the Correlator and the received alert al.
The algorithm examines each explanation expl of lastState.
For each couple 〈ag, pstNodeSet〉 in expl, GetGlobalRightSet computes
the alternative global right sets. Each element of this set is a tuple 〈ag, pstNode, rights〉
that represents that ag has implemented the sequence determined by pstNode
to acquire the rights in rightSet. This set is the union of the initial rights of
ag with those it has acquired through the sequence it has implemented. The
set of rights granted by the sequence is the value of acquiredRightSet of each
node. Hence, we have to merge this set and the one of the initial rights of
ag.
IsAcceptable determines if at least the precondition of one compatible
attacks with the alert al is included in rightSet. If this is the case, the corre-
sponding agent ag and the trie node pstNode are inserted into 0daySeqSet.
Finally, if the 0daySeqSet is not empty, the algorithm signals the possi-
ble 0-day sequences with the alert al. Otherwise, further investigations are
required to discover potential 0-day vulnerabilities.
Obviously, the main loop determines the complexity of the algorithm.
However, the loop can be parallelized by applying a map paradigm, because
each expl computation is independent. Again, this requires concurrent inser-
tions into a set.
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Algorithm 4.8 Investigation
Input: lastState, the last valid explanation set computed by the Correlator ;
al, the actual alert
Output: information on 0-day sequences or 0-day vulnerabilities
1: 0daySeqSet← ∅
2: for all expl in lastState do
3: for all (ag, pstNodeSet) in expl do
4: for all (ag, pstNode, rightSet)inGetGlobalRightSet(ag, pstNodeSet)
do
5: if IsAcceptable(rightSet, al) then
6: Add(0daySeqSet, ag, pstNode)
7: end if
8: end for
9: end for
10: end for
11: if 0daySeqSet is not empty then
12: Signal0daySeq(0daySeqSet, al)
13: else
14: Investigate0dayV uln()
15: end if
Chapter 5
Experimental results - Failure
Detection
This chapter presents the testing environment of the prototype and reports
the main experimental results. At ﬁrst, we evaluate the main SIEM capabil-
ities in the failure detection case where the sensors can also return the result
of the attacks.
5.1 Testing environment
We implemented a prototype of the Haruspex based SIEM to evaluate its
main capabilities.
Since we cannot test the prototype in a real environment, we have also
implemented a proper software module to generate an alert stream used
as the input of the SIEM. This module, the AlertGenerator, simulates the
alerts produced from the attack chains of an agent set. The module accesses
the Haruspex complex attack database to retrieve agent attack sequences to
simulate. If the agent set includes more than one agent, the simulation refers
to the case of concurrent attacks. As a consequence, the AlertGenerator
interleaves in a random way the attack chains of distinct agents to produce
a single alert stream. This is the stream produced by a sequence of attacks
that is the ordered interleaving of the chains. Since we are in the failure
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detection case, the module generates alerts only for successful attacks.
We simulate each agent set several times to produce reliable statistics.
Each simulation considers the case of a single attacker, two or three concur-
rent agents. The user can specify both the number of simulations per agent
and the number of concurrent agents per simulation. For our purpose, we
consider at most three concurrent agents, because a larger number of agents
corresponds to a scenario with a neglectable probability.
To be fair, in case of simultaneous attackers we consider all the permuta-
tions of the agent set of the Haruspex database. So each agent starts as the
i -th agent of the alert stream in an equal number of simulations.
Obviously, we have to monitor the behavior of the SIEM during each simu-
lation. So, some proper modules monitor and collect the statistics of interest
to produce the experimental results to evaluate the main SIEM capabili-
ties. These modules are the GlobalMatchStatistics, the GlobalAttrStatistics
and the GlobalPredStatistics. They measure, respectively, statistics on the
identiﬁcation of agents through pattern matching, the attribution and the
prediction.
Since we do not provide any agent attacking probability, the Predictor
applies the heuristic already described to attribute attacks and it does not
pair each prediction with a probability.
5.1.1 Synthetic database
As input database, we use a synthetic one called Labyrinth Hard. In the
following, we abbreviate it with simply labhard. This database includes 2859
elementary attacks and more than 200000 total attack sequences of 6 agents.
All agents have the same initial rights set. This implies that the agents start
from the same initial attack set. Furthermore, they try to reach the same
goal. As a consequence, diﬀerences among agents are only due to distinct
selection strategies and knowledge levels on the system, represented by the
lambda attribute. This implies that this database allows us to evaluate also
the characterization of agents through their attributes. It is worth noticing
this is a worst case situation where the diﬀerence between any two agents is
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AgID AVG Strategy Lambda
0 31,498 Smart Subnet First 1
1 12,59 max Increment 1
2 12,928 max Increment 2
3 30,507 max Probability 1
4 31,768 max Probability 2
5 36,745 max Eﬃciency 2
Table 5.1: Agent general information - failure detection case
very small.
5.2 General information
Table 5.1 reports the general information about the agents. Each record
represents:
• AgID, the agent identiﬁer,
• AVG, the average length of the agent attack sequences,
• Strategy, the strategy adopted by the agent,
• Lambda, the integer representing the degree of knowledge on the sys-
tem.
As expected, the agents that adopt a max Increment strategy have the
shortest average sequence length.
5.3 Pattern matching capability
The GlobalMatchStatistics measures distinct aspects to evaluate the identi-
ﬁcation capability of agents through pattern matching. In particular, Table
5.2 reports for each agent:
• AVG, the average distance between the ﬁrst attack of an agent and the
one of its identiﬁcation,
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• PCT, the percentage of AVG with respect to the average length of the
sequences of the agent,
• WID, the agent probability of being identiﬁed before implementing its
ﬁrst attack,
• UNID, the agent probability of not being identiﬁed at all.
The GlobalMatchStatistics measures these features in case of one, two or
three concurrent attackers. The -1, -2 and -3 in the table header identify
these cases.
The GlobalMatchStatistics computes the WID probability as the ratio
between the number of times the WID condition holds and the number of
agent simulations. The same applies for the UNID probability that considers
the case where the agent is not identiﬁed. Both are errors in the identiﬁcation,
but the UNID case is worse than the WID one, since the agent attacks and
reaches a goal before the SIEM realizes it.
Obviously, in all other cases the agent is correctly identiﬁed. So, the
GlobalMatchStatistics computes the agent AVG as the ratio between the
sum of the distances and the number of times this case occurs.
Table 5.2 shows some interesting results.
First of all, the probability that the pattern matching does not identify
some agent is larger than zero. So, a SIEM that only adopts this mechanism
to identify an agent may not identify an attacker. In particular, this happens
for agent 1 and 2 that have the higher UNID probabilities.
The UNID-1 probabilities are not null also in case of single attacker per
simulation. Since the Matcher ﬁlters attack combinations the are not unique
for an agent, it may happen that no pattern for a speciﬁc attack sequence is
present.
Agents 1 and 2 have also the higher PCT values. The PCT-1 values for
agent 1 and 2 are, respectively, 68% and 57%. So, if these agents attack in
isolation, the SIEM on average identiﬁes them when they have implemented
more than an half of their attack sequences. The PCT-2 and PCT-3 values
are even larger, but with lower diﬀerence between the values of the two
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AgID AVG-1 PCT-1 WID-1 UNID-1
0 5,293 16,805 0 0,002
1 8,594 68,262 0 0,621
2 7,437 57,526 0 0,42
3 8,368 27,43 0 0,047
4 9,53 29,999 0 0,069
5 9,672 26,323 0 0,009
AgID AVG-2 PCT-2 WID-2 UNID-2
0 4,402 13,975 0 0
1 17,203 136,646 0 0,572
2 16,053 124,174 0 0,3
3 7,856 25,75 0 0
4 8,266 26,019 0 0,004
5 9,878 26,882 0 0
AgID AVG-3 PCT-3 WID-3 UNID-3
0 4,669 14,824 0,278 0
1 25,174 199,953 0,002 0,519
2 25,517 197,379 0,006 0,22
3 7,704 25,252 0,231 0
4 7,995 25,168 0,215 0
5 9,654 26,271 0,246 0
Table 5.2: Pattern matching capability - failure detection case
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agents. Here, we have to remember that potentially attacks by other agents
can occur in between. Anyway, in the worst case scenario, agents 1 and 2
may have already implemented a long sequence of attacks.
Agent 0 adopts a Smart Subnet First strategy and has the lower AVG,
PCT, WID and UNID values, so it is the most easy to be identiﬁed.
The other agents instead have PCT values of 25% in all cases, so they
are soon identiﬁed. The Matcher identiﬁes them, on average, when the agent
has implemented a quarter of its sequence, so the SIEM has the remaining
75% of the chain to discover and stop its attempt.
The AVG values and the corresponding PCT are almost the same for
each agent even if the number of concurrent agents increases. This implies
that an agent will be identiﬁed through pattern matching on average with
AVG attacks, independently on the number of agents currently attacking the
system.
As a general rule, agents that adopt a max Increment strategy have a
lower probability of being identiﬁed. Furthermore, the identiﬁcation capabil-
ity of the pattern matching does not change if two agents only diﬀer because
of the lambda value. This implies that attack combinations diﬀer because of
the agent selection rather than because of the lambda attribute.
Furthermore, as the number of concurrent agents increases, the WID
probability increases as well. As a matter of fact, the ordered interleaving of
concurrent agents produces sequences of attacks similar to some patterns of
other agents. As a consequence, the UNID probability decreases.
The GlobalMatchStatistics measures the number of times a condition
holds on the agent that has been identiﬁed set to evaluate the accuracy
of the pattern matching. We consider some conditions:
• PID, the ﬁnal identiﬁed agent set is equal to the set of simulated agents,
• NPID, it includes all the simulated agents and others,
• ONID, it includes at least one simulated agent that is not identiﬁed,
but at least one that is identiﬁed,
• NOID, it is disjoint with the set of simulated agents.
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ConcNoAg PID-ratio NPID-ratio ONID-ratio NOID-ratio
1 0,805 0 0 0,195
2 0,001 0,715 0,276 0,008
3 0 0,664 0,336 0
Table 5.3: Pattern matching accuracy - failure detection case
Table 5.3 reports the corresponding probability computed as the ratio
between each value and the sum of all values.
As we can see, the most accurate results are produced when just one
agent attacks. In all other cases, we have a high value of NPID-ratio, so
the Matcher overestimates the agents currently attacking the system. This
shows that, at least in the severe case we have considered, the identiﬁcation
of agent through attack pattern matching does not return reliable and precise
results.
5.4 Attribution capability
The attribution is similar to the identiﬁcation of attacking agents through
pattern matching. As a consequence, the GlobalAttrStatistics measures and
produces the same statistics of the GlobalMatchStatistics. This simpliﬁes the
comparison of the two approaches. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 report these statistics.
Table 5.4 reports the attribution capability values measured by the Glob-
alAttrStatistics.
First of all, we notice that the Predictor never identiﬁes an agent before
it is actually attacking the system. Furthermore, all the agents are identiﬁed.
This implies that the attribution is able to correctly identify each agent.
Agents 1 and 2 are the most diﬃcult to identify, as through pattern
matching. Anyway, the worst case happens in the most unlikely scenario
where three agents attack concurrently. Furthermore, the values of AVG
and PCT of these agents are much lower than the corresponding values for
the pattern matching. The diﬀerence in the PCT values of these agents is
larger than before. As a consequence, here the distinct values of lambda aﬀect
the attribution capability.
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AgID AVG-1 PCT-1 WID-1 UNID-1
0 3,019 9,584 0 0
1 4,039 32,085 0 0
2 2,144 16,588 0 0
3 4,24 13,899 0 0
4 4,786 15,066 0 0
5 6,069 16,517 0 0
AgID AVG-2 PCT-2 WID-2 UNID-2
0 6,987 22,182 0 0
1 10,783 85,651 0 0
2 7,15 55,307 0 0
3 10,215 33,483 0 0
4 10,283 32,37 0 0
5 11,637 31,669 0 0
AgID AVG-3 PCT-3 WID-3 UNID-3
0 11,689 37,109 0 0
1 16,059 127,558 0 0
2 12,806 99,054 0 0
3 14,352 47,044 0 0
4 14,896 46,891 0 0
5 16,289 44,329 0 0
Table 5.4: Attribution capability - failure detection case
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ConcNoAg PID-ratio NPID-ratio ONID-ratio NOID-ratio
1 1 0 0 0
2 1 0 0 0
3 1 0 0 0
Table 5.5: Attribution accuracy - failure detection case
For all other agents the AVG and PCT values are larger than before
in all the cases but those with a single attacker. Furthermore, these values
increase as the number of concurrent agents increases. This shows that the
concurrent attacks of distinct agents impair the attribution capability.
Agents 3 and 4 have the same strategy with diﬀerent lambda, but their
AVG and PCT values are not so diﬀerent. This implies that the lambda
for the max Probability strategy does not characterize the agents for the
attribution perspective.
Although simultaneous attacks impair the attribution capability, Table
5.5 shows that in all simulations the Predictor correctly and precisely identi-
ﬁes the attacking agents. As a consequence, the attribution is accurate and
reliable.
5.5 Prediction capability
For each alert of the stream, the Predictor computes a set of predictions.
From this set, the GlobalPredStatistics extracts the set of next attacks of any
agent and stores its cardinality paired with the index of the alert. At the end
of the simulations, the GlobalPredStatistics computes the average cardinality
of the next attack sets for each alert index. This procedure is repeated for a
single attacker, two and three concurrent agents. Obviously, a lower average
cardinality results in a more accurate prediction.
Figure 5.1 plots the graph of the average cardinality of the next attack
sets over the number of alerts. The SingleAg curve corresponds to a single
attacker, ConcAg2 and ConcAg3 correspond to, respectively, two and three
concurrent agents.
We can see that the three curves have a descending trend. Obviously,
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Figure 5.1: The Prediction capability - failure detection case
they have a spike in the ﬁrst alerts because at the beginning of a sequence
an attacker can choose its attack in a larger set.
While the curve associated with a single attacker decreases in a monotonic
way, those of the other two cases have some spikes. This may occur when
another agent executes its ﬁrst attack in the simulation.
Since all the curves have a descending trend, the prediction continuously
restricts the next attack set of the agents by pruning the set of possible
next attacks alert by alert. This happens because the SIEM knows that
the sequence of attacks includes only successful ones and we assume that
a successful attack is never repeated in a chain. As a consequence, in the
failure detection case, the prediction can predict future attacks.
Chapter 6
Experimental results - Attack
Detection
This chapter reports the same tests previously discussed, but for the attack
detection case where the sensors signal the detected attack without its out-
come.
6.1 Testing environment
Obviously, to produce fair results, the whole testing environment is the same
as before. The only diﬀerence is that the AlertGenerator now generates also
alerts for failed attacks. The user can modify the probability of repeating an
attack before it is successful.
6.2 General information
Table 6.1 reports the same information on the agents as in the previous sec-
tion. For each agent, the table shows the average length of attack sequences,
strategy and lambda in the case of attack detection.
Obviously, here the average length of attack sequences is larger than in
the failure detection case because of the repetition of failed attacks.
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AgID AVG Strategy Lambda
0 53,31 Smart Subnet First 1
1 26,496 max Increment 1
2 24,308 max Increment 2
3 42,15 max Probability 1
4 39,728 max Probability 2
5 52,693 max Eﬃciency 2
Table 6.1: Agent general information - attack detection case
6.3 Pattern matching capability
Table 6.2 reports the pattern matching capability. The AVG values includes
also repetition of failed attacks.
As we can see, the considerations done in the previous section for WID
and UNID probabilities still hold. Here there is a little increase of theWID-2
probabilities, but this could be a statistical ﬂuctuation.
The real diﬀerence may be found in the AVG and PCT values. Although
the AVG values are larger than the corresponding ones in the failure detection
case, the values of PCT are lower. This is due to the longer attack chains
of the agents. Anyway, larger AVG value also implies that an attacker can
even implement a larger number of successful attack before being identiﬁed.
Table 6.3 shows an important result. The attack repetition due to fail-
ures decreases the PID-ratio while it increases the NPID-ratio in the single
attacker case. This may be explained by considering that attack repetitions
can generate the same attack sequence in a pattern of another agent, but,
anyway, they also identify the simulated agent. This increases the NPID-
ratio.
When two or three agents attack concurrently, the values are in line with
the corresponding ones of the failure detection case.
As a consequence, without the attack result, the pattern matching ap-
proach has a lower accuracy.
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AgID AVG-1 PCT-1 WID-1 UNID-1
0 5,572 10,451 0 0,006
1 14,47 54,613 0 0,657
2 12,462 51,266 0 0,407
3 8,85 20,996 0 0,051
4 9,525 23,975 0 0,049
5 12,268 23,283 0 0,008
AgID AVG-2 PCT-2 WID-2 UNID-2
0 5,201 9,756 0,024 0
1 22,671 85,565 0 0,578
2 23,544 96,854 0 0,278
3 8,501 20,168 0,041 0,002
4 8,986 22,619 0,059 0,002
5 11,114 21,093 0,044 0
AgID AVG-3 PCT-3 WID-3 UNID-3
0 4,556 8,546 0,287 0
1 33,619 126,886 0,011 0,469
2 34,876 143,471 0,009 0,143
3 9,039 21,445 0,241 0
4 9,743 24,525 0,3 0
5 10,797 20,491 0,269 0
Table 6.2: Pattern matching capability - attack detection case
ConcNoAg PID-ratio NPID-ratio ONID-ratio NOID-ratio
1 0,404 0,4 0 0,196
2 0 0,728 0,258 0,014
3 0 0,71 0,29 0
Table 6.3: Pattern matching accuracy - attack detection case
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AgID AVG-1 PCT-1 WID-1 UNID-1
0 3,841 7,204 0 0
1 4,268 16,109 0 0
2 3,636 14,958 0 0
3 4,623 10,968 0 0
4 4,797 12,076 0 0
5 7,857 14,912 0 0
AgID AVG-2 PCT-2 WID-2 UNID-2
0 10,187 19,109 0 0
1 12,769 48,191 0 0
2 10,357 42,608 0 0
3 11,235 26,655 0 0
4 12,367 31,128 0 0
5 14,798 28,084 0 0
AgID AVG-3 PCT-3 WID-3 UNID-3
0 14,337 26,894 0 0
1 19,985 75,428 0 0
2 16,989 69,889 0 0
3 19,109 45,336 0 0
4 18,385 46,278 0 0
5 21,715 41,21 0 0
Table 6.4: Attribution capability - attack detection case
6.4 Attribution capability
The attribution capability is not aﬀected by the uncertainty on the attack
result, as Table 6.4 shows.
Again, all the WID and UNID values are equal to zero, so there is no
error in the attribution.
Obviously, the AVG values increase with respect to the failure detection
case. This is due to several factors. One of them is the repetition of fail-
ures. Anyway, also the average agent sequence length increases and this can
contribute to improve the PCT values.
Notice that now the Predictor attributes the Agents 1 and 2 with PCT of,
respectively, 75% and 69% in the worst case of three concurrent agents. These
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ConcNoAg PID-ratio NPID-ratio ONID-ratio NOID-ratio
1 1 0 0 0
2 1 0 0 0
3 1 0 0 0
Table 6.5: Attribution accuracy - attack detection case
Figure 6.1: The Prediction capability - attack detection case
values are signiﬁcantly better than the corresponding ones in the previous
section. In this case, failed attacks simplify the solution.
Table 6.5 shows that also in the attack detection case the attribution
returns accurate results.
6.5 Prediction capability
Figure 6.1 plots the average cardinality of the next attack sets with respect
to the number of alerts, as in the failure detection case.
When a single agent attacks, at ﬁrst, the curve decreases but then it
increases. This implies that, after some attacks, there is an increase in the
number of attacks the agents can select to reach their goals.
The curve of two concurrent agents is almost parallel to the X axis but
with an increasing trend. This means that the cardinality of the next attack
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set increases because we consider both successful and failed attacks some
agents can implement.
Only the curve associated with three concurrent agents respects the de-
creasing trend after a spike.
As a result, since in the attack detection case the SIEM cannot known the
result of the attacks, the prediction cannot properly reduce the next attack
set. This strongly decreases the accuracy of the prediction.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
This chapter summarizes this thesis and its results. Then, it outlines some
future works.
7.1 Final remarks
The increasing complexity of the infrastructure of ICT systems strongly in-
creases the complexity of security monitoring because security tools have to
rebuild the security status of the whole system to detect and prevent se-
quences of attacks. This problem is faced in a modular way. A network
of sensors detects single attacks, while the Security Information and Event
Management (SIEM) analyzes these alerts to discover how they are corre-
lated. This correlation exploits a proper knowledge base.
We have deﬁned and implemented a new SIEM framework based on the
output of Haruspex, a suite to automate the assessment and the management
of ICT risk. The suite simulates the behavior of a set of intelligent agents
that may attack the system and it returns a database of the attack sequences
these agents can implement and the probability of each sequence. This is the
knowledge base that the correlation uses.
Since distinct sensors may be characterized by widely diﬀerent capabili-
ties, our evaluation has considered two main cases. In the ﬁrst one, failure
detection, the sensors can detect not only the occurrence of attacks, but also
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their result. In other one, attack detection, the sensors can only signal attacks
without their outcome.
We have evaluated the capabilities of the prototype of the proposed SIEM
through simulations that have considered distinct implementation strategies.
In these simulations we have collected several measures to evaluate the re-
liability and accuracy of the proposed framework. The outcomes of these
simulations have shown several interesting results.
The pattern matching approach cannot produce accurate results. It pro-
duces the most accurate results only when a single agent attacks the system
in the failure detection case. In the other cases, it overestimates the set of
agents actually attacking the system. As a consequence, the identiﬁcation of
agents through pattern matching is not reliable in practice.
Obviously, any increase in the number of agents that are concurrently
attacking the system increases the complexity of the correlation. As a con-
sequence, also the complexity of attribution increases. Even if, on average,
the attribution requires more attacks to identify an agent than the pattern
matching approach, it is always accurate.
From the pattern matching and attribution perspectives, the selection
strategy of an agent is the only attribute that really characterizes it. Instead,
its lambda attribute aﬀects the SIEM identiﬁcation capabilities just in one
case. This may be explained by considering that while the lambda can aﬀect
the order of some attacks, the attacks are mostly related to a strategy and a
goal, so all the agents sharing these two attributes will implement the same
attacks.
Finally, the prediction of future attacks is eﬀective and accurate only in
the failure detection case. When the sensors can detect attacks but not their
outcome, the prediction cannot properly prune the set of next attacks because
an agent can repeat the failed ones. As a consequence, the uncertainty on
the attack result impairs the prediction.
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7.2 Future works
This section outlines some future works on further evaluations and extensions
of the framework.
7.2.1 Real environment test
Till now, we have evaluated the prototype though simulations. As a future
work, we can deploy the SIEM in a real environment.
Since a network of sensors can produce a high volume of alerts, the SIEM
should be able to properly handle this volume. In particular, we can evaluate
some aspects not considered in our current experiments.
First of all, we can measure the SIEM capability in validating alerts.
This allow us to evaluate the false positive and negative rates that the SIEM
recognizes.
By deploying the SIEM in a dedicated machine, we can measure its pro-
cessing overhead and the throughput it can achieve. The SIEM throughput is
a very important measure, because a high throughput implies that the SIEM
can process a large number of alerts in a short period. As a consequence, the
SIEM can detect and react to complex attacks in a short time.
Furthermore, by changing the conﬁguration of the network of sensors,
i.e. their number and the subset of the system that is monitored, we can
also evaluate the throughput each conﬁguration requires as a function of the
number and kind of sensors.
Finally, we can evaluate the SIEM capabilities by deploying a distributed
version of the framework.
7.2.2 Sensors deployment and ruleset generation
The framework has assumed a proper placement and conﬁguration of the
sensors. If we relax this assumption, the SIEM has to produce information
on both these aspects.
The SIEM now includes also a proper module that receives as input the
database of elementary and complex attacks of Haruspex, the topology of
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the system, a database of available sensors, some constraints on them, e.g.
the maximum number, and a database that pairs each vulnerability with the
corresponding signature.
By analyzing this information, the module can generate the list of sen-
sors to be deployed and the allocation of each sensor. This list pairs each
sensor with the rules enabling the detection of an attack set and the optimal
placement in the system. This new feature has to be evaluated.
Furthermore, the sensors may not be able to detect some attacks because
of their capabilities or placement. As a consequence, we can evaluate the
SIEM capabilities in this case.
7.2.3 False positive and false negative handling
Actually, the framework has not considered the case where the SIEM has
processed a false positive or a false negative.
The former implies a mismatch in the correlation that may be resolved by
removing an attack from the detected sequence. Furthermore, the resulting
sequence may match one the agents execute with a large probability. This is
a strong indication that the removed attack corresponds to a false positive.
Similar considerations apply to false negative, but the handling has to
add attacks to sequences instead of removing them.
Both these solutions require some backtracking capability in the correla-
tion algorithm that may impair the attribution and prediction.
Further evaluations on these aspects are required to understand in more
details the correlation capability and its eﬀects on the attribution and pre-
diction.
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